A Study on Team Incentive Mechanism for Logistics Service Supply Chain

As logistics alliances are gaining in popularity as a method of competing in many industries, logistics service supply chain (LSSC) also has been an important mode on integration of logistics process. It gives priority to logistics service integrator (LSI), and comprises several logistics service suppliers (LSS) who provide material logistics functions. In LSSC, because all partnerships are selfish profit entities, their levels of effort are placed in an asymmetric information situation when they provide logistics service for customers. As a result, the supply chain has needed to constitute a team model in order to realize the common benefit of logistics alliance and avoid "free-rider" behavior of partial partnerships. In the paper, we consider a logistics service system including a LSI, i.e. principal, and multiple LSSs i.e. agents who are risk-averse. On the basis of some assumptions, aiming at the problem how the integrator prompts all partnerships to pick the upper effort level in term of cooperative target so as to jointly maximize the joint production, we design the coordinative and incentive mechanism of benefit using team theory. Then, under the uncertain competitive condition we educe a series of conclusions: if he/she correctly adjusts to punishing critical point and penalty in group penalties, or premium critical point and premium in group incentive, LSI can realize Pareto optimization by means of Nash equilibrium. Finally, we illustrate the model through several numerical examples.