Dynamic Game Analysis of Land Development and Utilization Planning Supervision under Supply Side Reform
Publication: ICCREM 2022
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to build a new dynamic game model including the uncertain probability and sending order of the double planning supervising to analyze the equilibrium conditions, according to the current causes of the planning supervising collusion in the land for real estate development, which was constructed for deterring planning supervisors from the planning supervising collusion. The results show (1) the double planning supervising policy is theoretically confirmed to be feasible and effective, which can reduce the planning supervising cost; the sending probability of the second planning supervisor is bigger; the risk and the moral pressure of the early planning supervisor is bigger too; and then the punishment for stopping the planning supervising collusion can be less. (2) This double planning supervising policy is also beneficial to weaken planning supervisors’ collusion preference. The conclusions show: continue to promote the existing planning supervision system (Department-Province-City-county), multi-level linkage, and full-coveraged planning inspectorate system must be established; strengthen the rigid laws and regulations of the “hard constraints”; perfect the form of punishment; enhance public participation in planning; and enhance public supervision of planning.
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ICCREM 2022
Pages: 639 - 651
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Published online: Dec 15, 2022
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