Research on Evolutionary Game of Vertical Collusion in Government Investment Projects
Publication: ICCREM 2021
ABSTRACT
In the case of asymmetric information of bidding market, the collusion behavior of bidding subject affects the public interest and engineering quality. On the basis of combing the existing research, this paper constructs the evolutionary game model of bidding supervision with the participation of government supervision department, bidding agent, and bidder, and discusses the methods that can effectively restrain the collusion behavior of bidding agent and bidder under the background of government investment project. This paper uses the system dynamics model simulation to obtain the key factors to prevent collusion and gives the strategy to combat collusion, which provides a reference for government regulators to combat collusion.
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ICCREM 2021
Pages: 900 - 906
Copyright
© 2021 American Society of Civil Engineers.
History
Published online: Dec 9, 2021
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