International Conference on Construction and Real Estate Management 2020
Analysis of the Evolutionary Equilibrium Strategy of Infrastructure Engineering Safety Supervision Based on Prospect Theory
Publication: ICCREM 2020: Intelligent Construction and Sustainable Buildings
ABSTRACT
As the construction technology of infrastructure engineering are complex and the interest subjects are multivariate, the safety accidents are likely to occur in the construction when lack of supervision. In order to reduce the frequency of safety accidents, it is necessary to establish effective supervision mechanism. Based on the prospect theory, this paper constructs the evolution game model of infrastructure engineering safety supervision, then analyzing the interactive mechanism of supervision behavior of main interest subjects, and studying the factors affecting the evolution of the system. The results show that the stable state of infrastructure engineering safety supervision system is affected by management cost, penalty intensity, and accident loss. Through analysis, government should improve the punishment and establish effective restraint mechanism, as well as clarify the regulatory responsibilities of all subjects. Besides, supervision units can improve supervision efficiency through technological innovation to reduce the probability of accidents, and guarantee the quality and safety of infrastructure projects.
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Information & Authors
Information
Published In
ICCREM 2020: Intelligent Construction and Sustainable Buildings
Pages: 574 - 582
Editors: Yaowu Wang, Ph.D., Harbin Institute of Technology, Thomas Olofsson, Ph.D., Luleå University of Technology, and Geoffrey Q. P. Shen, Ph.D., Hong Kong Polytechnic University
ISBN (Online): 978-0-7844-8323-7
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© 2020 American Society of Civil Engineers.
History
Published online: Oct 14, 2020
Published in print: Oct 14, 2020
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