International Conference on Construction and Real Estate Management 2019
Restraining the Illegal Sublease Phenomenon of Public Rental Housing in China: Based on Dynamic Evolutionary Game Theory
Publication: ICCREM 2019: Innovative Construction Project Management and Construction Industrialization
ABSTRACT
In China, public rental housing helps solve the problem of “sandwich layer” housing difficulties. However, public rental housing is still in the exploratory stage. Illegal sublease phenomenon occurs frequently, which destroys the available supply system of housing and harms the public interest. How to prevent sublease behavior has become an urgent problem. This paper analyzes the interest relationship among governmental regulators, censors, and tenants. Based on evolutionary game theory, the stability strategies of the three parties under different conditions and the three groups of evolutionary stability strategies of the whole game system under different initial conditions are obtained. At last, some suggestions for the path innovation of Chinese public rental housing regulatory system are put forward.
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Information & Authors
Information
Published In
ICCREM 2019: Innovative Construction Project Management and Construction Industrialization
Pages: 905 - 913
Editors: Yaowu Wang, Ph.D., Harbin Institute of Technology, Mohamed Al-Hussein, Ph.D., University of Alberta, and Geoffrey Q. P. Shen, Ph.D., Hong Kong Polytechnic University
ISBN (Online): 978-0-7844-8230-8
Copyright
© 2019 American Society of Civil Engineers.
History
Published online: Aug 29, 2019
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