The Analysis of Freight Information Market Based on Game Theory

There is a communication barrier between carrier and shipper in present freight information market. The shipper can't completely know the carrier's relevant information. By virtue of the analytical idea of dynamic games with imperfect information, this paper deduces the negative consequence which the information asymmetry between the both sides in business very likely leads to. In order to remove this phenomenon, the ultimate way is to set up freight information exchange platform (FIEP) that can factually reflect the backgrounds of carriers and shippers. In course of building and popularizing the FIEP, this paper argues that the government should perform a guiding function. It applies evolutionary game theory to simulate the process that information agencies join in the FIEP in succession. The result shows that there are two distinct popularizing effects. The government should adopt supporting policy to attract the participation of information agencies. When the proportion of FIEP's users to all information agencies in a region amounts to a turning point determined by evolutionary game, the government could begin to implement charging policy. The other information agencies would still like to enter the FIEP, although all of them may be asked to pay the user charge. In the end, the FIEP will be widely employed in freight information market. As a result, the above game analysis is helpful for the government to decide the role orientation and support extent during the informatization construction.