Too frequent reports in the media of engineering and construction failures, the ruinous awards from lawsuits over liability and equally ruinous costs of liability insurance, if obtainable, all make an awareness of the necessity for quality in engineering works a matter of professional survival. Lack of quality in engineering works is not pervasive but it does occur. Some causes of poor quality are presented in this paper. Those causes are numerous, and can run all the way through the engineering process from siting through construction. Trade‐offs between the impacts of investigation, design, contracts, construction and cost on construction quality are complex but some fundamentals seem clear. Five top causes of inferior engineering quality are: (1) Designs which lag construction; (2) designs which lag procurement; (3) inadequate cost control; (4) lack of effective scheduling; and (5) lack of change control. Other causes are presented in the paper.

The ASCE Board of Direction unanimously adopted a Strategic Plan and strategic planning process in April 1985. However, the continuing success of strategic planning for ASCE remains to be assessed over the next two years in terms of the effective implementation of the many Plan initiatives, and maintenance of the broad‐based level of support and participation that is critical to a continuing strategic planning process. The paper, authored by the Chairman of the COSOPO Task Committee on Strategic Planning, traces the development of the Plan over a period, of eighteen months leading to Plan adoption. The paper identifies a number of issues and obstacles to effective strategic planning in general, examines them in light of the ASCE strategic planning process and experience to date, and analyzes the challenges remaining to make strategic planning work for ASCE on a continuing basis. The paper concludes with a set of recommendations for developing a strategic plan and implementing a strategic planning process.

The American Society of Civil Engineers has been organizationally supportive of the metric system as far back as 1876. The background of supportive actions from that time to the present are described in this paper. This background serves to introduce the report that follows prepared by the ASCE Committee on Metrication (COM) for consideration by the ASCE Board of Directors. The report summarized the results of a questionnaire circulated worldwide to determine the extent, Usefulness, and acceptance of the SI metric system and then presents recommendations to the Board of Direction. The world survey, with responses from 51 countries, indicated essentially a unanimous endorsement of SI, and the ASCE board subsequently adopted the recommendations contained in the COM report. This action resulted in a policy statement supporting the SI system in ASCE and all civil engineering activities, including education; pertinent book, cartographic, and geodetic projects; and in all ASCE publications.

Public concern for the management of toxic wastes has grown with the unprecedented release of chemical compounds into the environment and the growth of scientific knowledge regarding their unintended as well as intended effects. As awareness of possible risks increased, government began to regulate the commercial use of toxic materials, but their disposal as waste was left largely to local political jurisdictions and unregulated private firms. A series of environmental disasters (e.g., at Love Canal, NY) alarmed the public and led to creation of the Superfund and numerous state measures to bring the toxic waste problem under control. Efforts made to date have not matched the magnitude of the issue. The engineering professions—and especially civil engineers—have a major role to play in the design and management of systems to abate the problem. No single method may suffice; recycling, detoxifying, and neutralizing are among the alternative solutions. Major ethical problems are involved in the care and custody of dangerous substances that cannot be destroyed and may require perpetual care. Meanwhile engineers are handicapped in their role until our society and its political representatives decide to give the issue the attention that human health and safety requires.

The purpose of this paper is to provide a valid solution for the major marine operational problems of the Panama Canal as derived from marine experience over many years. In so doing it gives parts of Isthmian canal history from the Age of Discovery, tells about some of the steps leading to its construction, presents parts of the story for the separation of the Pacific Locks by means of a small lake in contrast to the consolidated Atlantic Locks, and develops the solution aimed at providing the best canal for navigation at least cost.

At the October 1985 Board of Direction meeting in Detroit the report prepared by the ASCE Task Committee on Design Responsibility was adopted as official ASCE policy. The report recommended that (1) The Engineer of Record (EOR) should be responsible for the integrity of the structural design; and (2) the EOR should either design the connections or review and approve (for structural adequacy) the connections selected by the fabricator. Changes in technology and society as a whole which started in the 1960's had an adverse effect on the past practices for steel construction. This topic is of national interest because of an increase in structural failures in recent years and a trend toward assigning some of the design responsibility to the fabricator. Judge Deutsch's ruling concerning the role of the EOR and the fabricator on the Hyatt skywalk collapse further intensified interest in this subject. Hopefully, the recommendations presented in the ASCE report will reverse the practice of divided responsibility for the design of steel structures and provide guidance for the steel construction industry.

Engineers who blow whistles are sometimes regarded as public advocates when they report questionable designs or processes that may violate sound engineering principles, since the engineer's paramount responsibility is to protect the public health and safety. If these situations are corrected, future “accidents” can be prevented and billions saved in legal fees and judgments. Cases in which management fired the whistleblower and/or did not heed such warnings are cited. Support for safety‐conscious whistleblowers grows as technology becomes more complex, and as risk analysis develops. Support involves voluntary development of corporate and/or engineering society ombudsmen; or mandatory, legal constraints against employers where public officials investigate the cases. Employees are obligated ethically or legally to report potentially unsafe situations and are supposedly protected against retaliation. The paper recommends expansion of the ombudsman's functions in large industries, and in engineering societies to support their members; the creation of courts of professional opinion to render binding decisions on technical matters; and legislative approval for censuring legislators if their vote overrides the recommendations of courts of professional opinion and “accidents” happen later.