Institutional Coordination of Disaster Management: Engaging National and Local Governments in Japan
Publication: Natural Hazards Review
Volume 22, Issue 1
Abstract
Coordinating a wide range of organizations is crucial for disaster management. This paper reviews the coordinating mechanisms of disaster management in Japan, in particular focusing on the relationship between national and local governments. While local governments have the principal responsibility of managing disasters, they often have limited capacity and experience in disaster management. Furthermore, they are often overstretched with the various tasks of response and recovery. Supporting local governments from the outside and coordinating such support activities are essential in mitigating disaster damage. This paper examines (1) coordination mechanisms, and (2) actual coordinating efforts of response and recovery in recent disasters such as the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami in 2011. It was found that Japan is evolving in coordinating mechanisms by learning from disasters. The national platform of coordination was established over 50 years ago. Similar platforms were established at the local level as well. Each national agency has established and strengthened the supporting teams of response and recovery efforts in affected areas. Local governments outside the affected areas also provide support to affected governments according to pre-agreement.
Introduction
Coordinating organizations is crucial for effective disaster management, since a wide range of organizations, such as government agencies, local governments, civil society organizations, private companies, international organizations, and local communities are engaged in preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery activities. Proper coordination could save human lives, decrease property losses, and accelerate recovery efforts.
This paper aims at identifying the policies of strengthening coordination in disaster management. Japan has been coping with natural disasters throughout its history of nearly 2,000 years and has developed coordinating mechanisms as a modern state for the last 150 years by learning from disasters. This learning process is useful for other countries to improve the policies of coordinating mechanisms and make society more resilient to disasters. For example, Asian countries are vulnerable to natural disasters, but establishing a coordinating mechanism among various organizations is a challenge (Ishiwatari 2013).
This paper reviews the coordinating mechanisms of disaster management in Japan, in particular the relationship between national and local governments. While local governments have the principal responsibility of managing disasters, they often have limited capacity and experience in disaster management. Learning from disasters that have happened in other areas is a challenge. Furthermore, local governments are often overstretched with the work of response and recovery following mega-disasters. Supporting local governments from outside and coordinating such support activities are essential for disaster management.
The paper examines (1) coordination mechanisms under normal circumstances, and (2) actual coordinating efforts of response and recovery between national and local governments at the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami (GEJE) in 2011 and other recent disasters.
Evolution of Disaster Management Coordination
Recent studies have examined changes in coordination mechanisms in Japan mainly from legislation and administration perspectives. Most studies, however, have not focused on practical coordinating and supporting mechanisms of various organizations, which this paper examines.
As in other countries, Japan historically placed more emphasis on response and recovery activities than preparedness and mitigation. Since the country has suffered from various disasters such as tsunamis, earthquakes, floods, and landslides throughout its history, rulers were concerned about disaster management and supported affected people by providing food, water, and shelter (Kawata 2007). For example, following the 1855 Ansei Edo Earthquake in present-day Tokyo that killed some 7,000 people, the Tokugawa shogunate, which was the government body before the modern state, established five evacuation shelters and provided relief goods of water and food (Nakamura 2006).
Following modernization during the Meiji revolution in the late nineteenth century, the government started developing capacity for relief activities. Relief goods storage legislation was enacted in 1880 to support farmers affected by disasters. In 1899, laws were passed to provide relief to people affected by disasters.
Following World War II, the legal system of disaster management was improved as follows:
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More comprehensive and planned mechanisms, including preventive measures, from the collection of various response measures;
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Democratic systems rooted in decentralized and local autonomy from centralized emergency law systems; and
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Benefits provided as a matter of right to avoid favoritism and protect public security (Shimoyama 2009).
The Disaster Relief Act was enacted in 1947 to respond to disasters following the Showa-Nankai Earthquake and Tsunami in 1946, which killed over 1,400 people (Cabinet Office 2015). This law embodies the right of life guaranteed by the new constitution in the event of a disaster. Nishikawa (2007) pointed out two turning points in policy formulation after the Isewan Typhoon in 1959 and the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (Kobe) in 1995. The Isewan Typhoon caused serious damage, including the deaths of over 5,000 people in 1959, and drove the Japanese government to pass new legislation. The Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act was enacted to implement an integrated approach to managing disaster risks in 1961. The law covers the disaster management cycle of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. It also stipulates the details of the national platform, financial arrangements, disaster management plans, and institutions (Nishikawa 2010).
Municipality governments have the principal responsibility for managing disasters, such as formulating local disaster management plans, conducting emergency operations, creating warning systems, issuing evacuation orders, and conducting flood fighting and relief activities. National and local governments share responsibilities and have distinct and complementary roles (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari 2014).
Community-based organizations have a history of several centuries (Ishiwatari 2012). Local communities established flood-fighting corps and firefighting corps to protect their communities from disasters. These corps are still functioning and conducting a wide range of activities, such as fire prevention, first aid demonstrations, training for community members, patrolling, support of evacuation, and strengthening river dykes against flooding (Haddad 2004; JICA 2003; Yamamoto 2017).
Features of Government Coordinating Mechanisms
The Central Disaster Management Council is chaired by the Prime Minister and consists of concerned ministers, disaster management organizations, and academic experts (Fig. 1). The council formulates the overall policies of disaster management, provides necessary advice to government organizations, and coordinates various organizations (Cabinet Office 2015). While this institutional arrangement is similar to those in other countries (Ishiwatari 2013), the following unique areas exist:
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Special committees of the National Diet for disaster management: The National Diet established special committees for disaster management in 1961 in both its lower and upper houses. Diet members examine the issues of disasters and countermeasures against disasters.
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White paper on disaster management: The cabinet submits a white paper on disaster management to the National Diet annually. The white paper covers the issues of disaster management and the records of disasters so that the Diet can monitor the progress of disaster management. The white paper also shows the national budget of the disaster risk reduction (DRR) by augmenting the budgets of the concerned organizations. The public also can understand the government’s efforts in disaster management and receive the information needed for their actions in disaster management.
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Committee for technical investigation: The Central Disaster Management Council forms committees to study technical matters. The committees have covered various areas, such as damage estimate of large-scale disasters, review of countermeasures following disasters, capacity building, and information sharing.
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Following GEJE in 2011, a technical investigation committee reviewed countermeasures against disaster and recommended policies and countermeasures against earthquakes and tsunamis. Based on these recommendations, the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act and the Basic Disaster Management Plan were revised. Key revisions included
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Preparation for low-probability and large-scale earthquakes and tsunamis;
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Enhancement of supporting and coordinating mechanisms to local governments in affected areas;
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Improvement of the delivery of relief goods;
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Evacuee relocation coordination;
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Planning to raise public awareness through an education program on disaster management; and
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Incorporation of disaster management concepts in land use plans.
Prefecture and municipality governments established local disaster management committees to formulate local disaster management plans and promote the implementation of the plans.
The national ministries have a wide range of schemes to direct financial support for local governments. For example, the ministries provide subsidies for flood prevention infrastructure and search and rescue, relief goods in the response phase, transition shelters, rehabilitation of daily life for people and industry, and reconstruction for recovery.
Response to the Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami
This section reviews how national government organizations and other stakeholders have improved the mechanisms of support and coordination (Fig. 2) and responded to GEJE. These organizations had improved such mechanisms by learning from Kobe in 1995, which killed 6,437 people (Cabinet Office 2015). Local governments had the principal responsibility for managing disasters but had limited capacity and experience in response and recovery during GEJE due to the loss of headquarters, staff, and equipment. For example, the Rikuzentakata city government lost 111 staff members, accounting for one-fourth of its total staff, as well as government buildings and facilities on March 11, 2011 (Rikuzentakata City 2014). The tsunami hit the coastline in Tohoku in 2011 and washed away entire towns and villages. Economic damage was estimated at JPY 16.9 trillion, or approximately USD 150 billion. Around 20,000 people died or went missing, 30,000 houses were completely destroyed, and 270,000 houses were damaged (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari 2014).
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National Government
Initial Response
The national government set up a response office 4 min after the earthquake on March 11, 2011, and the Emergency Disaster Management Headquarters, headed by the prime minister, within 30 minutes. These offices oversaw and coordinated the response activities of government agencies and organizations concerned. This was a significant improvement in response from Kobe in 1995, after which it took over four hours to establish a response office and three days to establish the Emergency Disaster Management Headquarters. To improve response mechanisms, the government took the following measures:
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Formed an emergency team consisting of director generals across concerned ministries in February 1995;
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Started night duty staffing at the Disaster Management Bureau in March 1995;
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Built the emergency management center at the Prime Minister’s office in April 1996; and
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Appointed a Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary for Crisis Management in April 1998.
Emergency Teams
National government organizations coordinated to mobilize various response teams across the country (Table 1). Following their experience with Kobe in 1995, government organizations improved response mechanisms by strengthening coordination, establishing a chain of command, designating secretariat functions and rosters of emergency team members, and conducting training programs.
| Ministry or agency | Teams |
|---|---|
| Ministry of Defense | Japan self defense forces |
| Fire and Disaster Management Agency | Emergency fire response teams |
| National Police Agency | Interprefectural emergency rescue units |
| Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare | Disaster medical assistance team |
| Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism | Technical emergency control force |
Source: Data from Ranghieri and Ishiwatari (2014).
Japan Self Defense Forces
The Japan Self Defense Forces (JSDF) delayed search and rescue operations during Kobe because of late information sharing and delayed requests from local governments. Because of communication difficulties, it took the Hyogo Prefecture government over four hours to officially request JSDF support after the earthquake. In the years following Kobe, JSDF improved coordination with local governments and concerned organizations in routine situations to prepare for disasters and clarify standards for dispatching response teams. It mobilized some 107,000 personnel at the peak of the search and rescue operations in GEJE. It rescued some 19,000 people or nearly 70% of those rescued.
Firefighting
Fire response teams coming from outside Kobe had difficulty at the disaster sites in 1995. They could not communicate and cooperate because of limited radio frequency and different equipment, since municipality governments managed firefighting departments and obtained equipment independently. To improve response to large-scale disasters, the Fire and Disaster Management Agency of the national government created emergency fire response teams (FDMA 2020). Some 700 fire departments in 44 prefectures nationwide dispatched more than 30,000 firefighters for firefighting and search and rescue after GEJE. Also, teams from Tokyo, Osaka, Yokohama, and Kawasaki discharged water to cool down nuclear plants in Fukushima (FDMA 2011).
The agency developed a system that allowed response teams to share information on team deployments and damage situations following GEJE (Fig. 3) (FDMA 2012). This system was utilized after the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016, which killed around 270 people, damaged 213,000 houses, and caused economic damage totaling JPY 3.8 trillion, or approximately USD 34 billion (Kumamoto Prefecture 2018; Meteorological Agency 2020).
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Policing
Since police departments belong to prefecture governments, the National Police Agency formed nationwide disaster response units following Kobe in 1995. Among other operations, these units handle search and rescue, traffic control, outreach to affected people, and patrolling and investigation (NPA 2011).
Medical
During Kobe, emergency medical treatment could not be provided properly. Some hospital buildings had collapsed, and transport systems for injured persons were not properly arranged. If appropriate medical services had been available, it is estimated that some 500 people could have been saved (DMAT 2020).
The Disaster Medical Assistance Team (DMAT) was established in 1995 to conduct emergency operations in response to large-scale disasters. The team consists of medical doctors, nurses, and operational coordinators. In addition to emergency response to GEJE, DMAT had to provide care for people with chronic illness since the accompanying tsunami had washed away hospitals and medical facilities along the Tohoku coast.
Following GEJE, an emergency medical information system was created to share information on medical resources and needs among DMAT and concerned government organizations. The system provides information on support needs, DMAT activity status, and damage to hospitals.
Engineering
The Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism (MLIT) established the Technical Emergency Control Force (TEC FORCE) in 2008. TEC FORCE is the specialized team of ministry engineers and specialists with disaster response equipment like satellite communication vehicles, helicopters, and flood pumping trucks. Engineers assist local offices and municipalities in disaster-affected areas to quickly assess damage, identify measures to prevent additional damage, and provide technical assistance for rehabilitation and emergency response activities.
MLIT developed the Integrated Disaster Information Mapping System (DiMAPS) following GEJE to share information on damage, response activities, images, traffic information, and the like, necessary for operations among TEC FORCE teams and concerned organizations (Fig. 4) (MLIT 2015). This system was used during the Kumamoto Earthquake.
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Local Government and Private Sector
Local Government
Local governments outside the affected areas provided support to the municipalities affected by GEJE based on mutual aid agreements. Support activities cover a wide range: providing relief materials and equipment; sending medical teams, engineers, and experts; providing temporary shelter; coordinating volunteers; accepting affected people, and so forth. Staff are also engaged in rehabilitation work. This is a learning opportunity for local governments outside the affected areas. Staff can contribute to strengthening disaster management in the affected governments once they return to their offices. In October 2017, 1,775 staff members were dispatched to local governments in the affected areas from outside areas (Reconstruction Agency 2018b). The number of signed agreements is increasing, and most municipalities (98%) had signed agreements as of 2016 (Cabinet Office 2018).
The capacity of affected municipality governments to receive support is becoming a challenge. Affected municipalities should formulate plans that cover the volume and duration of necessary activities to be supported. Small municipality governments could not receive support smoothly during the GEJE response. The disaster management basic plan of the national government requires municipality governments to formulate plans for receiving support.
Private Sector
The private sector is expected to be engaged in response activities in specialized areas, such as logistics, construction, medical services, and broadcasting. Also, materials stocked at supermarkets, drugstores, hospitals, and so forth, can be used for relief goods. Local governments have signed preagreements with private companies on the extent of their expected response in the event of a natural disaster.
Based on preagreements, local construction companies began clearing debris from roads on the day GEJE occurred. This contributed to rescuing and relief operations by opening roads to devastated areas within a week (Ishiwatari 2014).
Recovery from GEJE
The national government formulated policies and plans with legislation and budgetary systems that guide local governments to implement recovery. Most housing reconstruction was completed eight years after GEJE.
The Reconstruction Agency, which was established in 2012, formulates national policies of recovery and serves as a “one-stop-shop” for local governments so that they do not need to apply for financial support separately to line ministries. The GEJE tsunami in 2011 devastated several prefectures, and a new agency was required to coordinate recovery efforts. After Kobe, the prefecture governments played coordinated roles since the main affected areas were located in Hyogo Prefecture.
The Japanese government is spending approximately twice the amount of estimated economic damage on recovery: a JPY 32 trillion recovery budget is being used to rebuild from JPY 16.9 trillion in economic damage until 2020 (Table 2).
| Area | Budget (JPY trillion) |
|---|---|
| Health and living support | 2.5 |
| Houses and communities | 13.4 |
| Industry and livelihood | 4.5 |
| Fukushima | 2.1 |
| Others | 9.5 |
| Total | 32.0 |
Source: Data from Reconstruction Agency (2018a).
Most house reconstruction was completed in 2019, eight years after GEJE (Fig. 5). From 2011 until 2018, 140,000 private houses were rebuilt with the financial support of government organizations. Out of a planned 19,000 homes at relocation sites, some 15,000, 82% of those planned, were constructed by February 2018. Some 29,000 public houses out of a planned 30,000 were constructed by March 2018. Local governments are providing public houses with subsidized rent for low-income groups and the elderly who cannot afford to reconstruct their homes. The number of evacuees decreased from some 470,000 people at peak just after GEJE to 73,000 in February 2018. Among the evacuees, some 40,000 persons lived in temporary housing (Reconstruction Agency 2018a).
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The recovery from GEJE in 2011 was longer than the recovery from Kobe in 1995, which required five years to complete housing reconstruction. While most houses were reconstructed at original places in Kobe, new relocation sites were constructed on higher ground to avoid potential tsunamis in Tohoku. Constructing relocation sites needs multiyear civil works and consensus building among members in each local community (Ishiwatari et al. 2017).
Although recovery progress varies by industry, sales of some 45% of companies affected by GEJE had fully recovered by 2018. Sales in the construction industry reached 80% of pre-earthquake levels because of recovery civil works, while sales in the marine and food-processing industries were still at just 30%. Eighty-three percent of tsunami-affected farmland was rehabilitated, and 92% of seafood-processing facilities were able to restart operations (Reconstruction Agency 2018a).
Drivers of Evolving Mechanisms
National government organizations recognize disaster management as a core value and continue improving the functions of this core value through learning from disasters (Council of Vice-Ministers for Institutional Arrangement for Risk Management of Government 2015). If the government organizations were to lose sight of this core value, they would face risks of dissolving the organizations (Nonaka 1995). For example, the Disaster Management Bureau in the National Land Agency was transferred to the Cabinet Office to strengthen coordinating and leading roles in the government following Kobe. Also, the functions of support for affected people were transferred to the Cabinet Office from the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labor following GEJE.
Government organizations further improved response mechanisms following GEJE. They responded to the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016 with improved mechanisms, conducting activities on a large scale and in the long term strengthening information, communication, logistics, and accommodation.
Involving local governments in learning processes is a challenge. Local governments in the Tohoku Region did not learn enough from Kobe and so repeated missteps in some areas during GEJE, as the Hyogo Prefecture did after Kobe. For example, they did not coordinate to prepare evacuation centers for disabled people and needed time to establish them. The disabled had to stay at destroyed houses for some days. Similarly, gender-related issues that were experienced during Kobe were repeated after GEJE. Local governments could not properly respond to women’s needs (Saito 2014).
The coordination mechanism of reconstruction after GEJE was unique. The World Bank (2014) categorizes three organizational models for reconstruction: (1) create a new organization, (2) strengthen and coordinate existing line ministries, and (3) establish a hybrid arrangement by creating a temporary agency. The Japanese Reconstruction Agency does not fall into any of these models since its main role is coordination, not implementation. The technical ministries are responsible for implementing projects in disaster areas.
Conclusion
Japanese practices show that national governments can improve coordination mechanisms by learning from disasters. Japan has improved coordination and emergency response at the national level. Each government organization established mechanisms to mobilize specialized teams from all over the country in the years following Kobe in 1995. Immediately after that earthquake, organizations could not engage well in response activities because of limited coordination. This may have led to the deaths of many people.
Involving local governments in learning processes is a challenge. National government organizations should support local governments in improving coordination by guiding policies and providing financial and technical support.
One of the most important lessons from GEJE in 2011 is that specialized teams need information sharing for long-term, independent operations. The Japanese Government strengthened its coordinating mechanisms and conducted response operations for the Kumamoto Earthquake in 2016. Furthermore, Japan established a reconstruction framework building on the foundation of existing disaster management coordination.
Data Availability Statement
No data, models, or code were generated or used during the study.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by JSPS KAKENHI Grant No. 19KK0025.
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Natural Hazards Review
Volume 22 • Issue 1 • February 2021
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This work is made available under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International license, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
History
Received: Apr 13, 2019
Accepted: Jul 21, 2020
Published online: Dec 15, 2020
Published in print: Feb 1, 2021
Discussion open until: May 15, 2021
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