Tohoku, Japan, Earthquake and Tsunami of 2011: Lifeline Performance

Two very large earthquakes (M=9.0 followed by M=7.9) impacted the northeast coast of Japan’s main island. The capital city Tokyo suffered some damage, but the greatest impacts occurred in the coastal prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima. The major lesson learned from observations of this extreme event is preparedness—preparedness in terms of emergency response and recovery rather than in terms of mitigation. Although mitigation is important, it must be part of the hazard reduction program. The follow-up investigation team noticed the balance of these factors in the rebuilding process. TCLEE also recognized the need to accelerate multihazard mitigation, emergency response, and recovery in lifelines and infrastructures. This extreme event highlighted the need to develop a knowledge base of earthquake-induced floods damaging underground facilities.

Japan has a long history of earthquakes and is highly sophisticated in terms of earthquake preparedness and earthquake engineering. Each new earthquake provides engineers with an opportunity to learn further lessons on how to protect communities. This chapter describes the plate tectonic setting, historic seismicity, local geologic conditions, seismological characteristics of the earthquake, areas of regional surface deformation, and subsidence. It continues with a discussion of tsunami characteristics, impacts, and response and recovery. Finally, it focuses on the geotechnical and engineering aspects of the earthquake and how they relate to lifelines. Three areas where the TCLEE team observed concentrated damage were areas of tsunami inundation, areas with weak soils, and weak infrastructure. The TCLEE team also observed tsunami inundation effects on lifelines in many coastal areas.

The March 11, 2011, earthquake and tsunami disabled the transportation network in northeastern Japan, particularly along the Sanriku coast. The tsunami scoured road and rail embankments, washed away bridges, and deposited debris that blocked roads and rails. Ground shaking, liquefaction, and lateral spreading also damaged roads and rails. This chapter presents major observations of this earthquake and recommendations to avoid future damage. The government made significant efforts to repair national expressways and private toll roads quickly. Japan’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Tourism (MLIT) was put in charge of the recovery of Tohoku for the first 20 days and initiated a plan called Operation Comb to clean the National Highway System in Tohoku. On March 18, the MLIT switched to emergency repair of roads and bridges and to helping local governments.

The electric power systems performed marginally in the Tohoku earthquake. Two investor-owned power utilities suffered the brunt of the earthquake damage: Tohoku Electric Power Company and Tokyo Electric Power Company. To appreciate the damage to the power system’s infrastructure fully, an understanding of the spatial variation in ground motions and the effects of the tsunami along the coastline is required. This chapter describes the main damage sustained at the four heavily damaged thermal power plants, Shin Sendai, Sendai, Haramachi, and Hachinohe, in the Tohoku system. Use of mobile transformers represents an effective measure to restore power quickly when small substations are damaged. Distributed generation power resources seem to be a suitable option for reducing risks associated with extensive power outages in the immediate aftermath of a disaster and for mitigating the effects of reduced bulk power generation capacity in the longer term.

The earthquake and tsunami resulted in loss of service to almost 1.5 million public switched telephony network (PSTN) lines on March 13. This affected 1,800 Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Corporation (NTT) buildings of all types in the Tohoku Region, mostly because of power outages. At the time of the earthquake, all telecommunications operators were in advanced stages of converting their systems to next generation networks (NGNs), which involves migrating from circuit switching technology to packet switching environments. The technology changes associated with NGNs involve replacing conventional digital switches with routers. In the case of the PSTN, it also involves an increased use of fiber to the curb (FTTC) or fiber to the home (FTTH) systems. This chapter discusses the performance of PSTN and wireless networks and additional infrastructure associated with communications network operators. Finally, the chapter summarizes major recommendations and observations.

Sendai International Airport (SDJ) was the only airport in the disaster area hit by both the earthquake and the tsunami. The airport officially opened for commercial flights on April 13, 2011, about five weeks after the earthquake and tsunami. When an airport is within the tsunami inundation zone, preventing water damage is very difficult or nearly impossible. The minimal earthquake damage to SDJ facilities such as terminal buildings, support buildings (hangers and control tower), and the runway indicated good seismic design. Japan Civil Defense and U.S. Air Force support to remove debris was critical in re-opening the airport for relief supplies. Without heavy-duty machinery the job would have taken much longer. Water-tight rooms for backup power generators, computer equipment, control equipment, and water-tight power circuits should be considered for airports that are within tsunami inundation zones.

Japan’s economy depends heavily on ports, many of which were affected by the earthquake and/or tsunami. The most devastating port and harbor damage observed was associated with the incoming and receding flow of tsunami inundation. The Port of Sendai–Shiogama complex—the only Tokutei Jyuuyou Kouwan in the impacted area—comprises two ports: the Port of Sendai in Sendai City and the Port of Shiogama in adjacent Shiogama City. The Port of Sendai lies directly east of the epicenter of the earthquake and was hit hard by both shaking and the tsunami. Beyond the direct damage incurred at the port, lack of electrical service also impeded recovery. The TCLEE team observed tsunami damage to three additional ports at Otsuchi, Kamaishi, and Kesenuma.

More than 35 million people in Japan felt the powerful M9.0 Great Tohoku earthquake of March 11, 2011, which caused moderate to major damage to potable water systems in Iwate, Miyagi, Fukushima, Ibaraki, and Chiba Prefectures. Because many water treatment plants are similar, this chapter includes only the earthquake impacts on selected wastewater treatment plants: Miyagi Prefecture Sennen Senan water transmission system and City of Sendai water system. It also presents the impact on Ishinomaki water system, Chiba Prefecture, and Ibaraki Prefecture. The chapter also describes leaks that occurred in axial slip joints (bellows-type) in a large-diameter water transmission pipeline in Yokohama, part of the Kanagawa Water Supply Authority water transmission system. In addition, it describes recent advances in water pipeline design and construction in Japan. Finally, the chapter highlights major observations and recommendations.

The Tohuku Earthquake impacted more than 800 km (500 mi) of Japan’s eastern coastline with strong shaking, ground subsidence, liquefaction, landslides, and tsunamis. In most cases, wastewater treatment plants (approximately 400 total) are located in the coastal areas and suffered both tsunami and liquefaction damage. This chapter summarizes the damage and restoration rates of wastewater treatment plants in the affected areas. Because most of these reinforced concrete structures are parallel to the coastline, they received the full impact of the surge, which caused significant damage. Various cities and agencies inventoried the damage to their gravity sewer collection systems, and the data indicate the severity of this large event.

Earthquake shaking and/or tsunami destruction damaged 10 oil refineries in Japan. The Petroleum Association of Japan facilitated emergency response and helped to secure a stable energy supply for the epicentral area. Natural gas supply was disrupted in eastern Japan from Kanto to Tohoku districts. This chapter lists TCLEE recommendations to improve seismic resilience in the liquid fuel and natural gas sectors. In their meeting with the TCLEE, Sendai Gas personnel provided an overview of their system, earthquake and tsunami damage, and restoration process. The Sendai Gas Bureau’s recovery effort was assisted by Japan Gas Association (JGA) efforts from Osaka Gas, Tokyo Gas, and 50 other JGA member companies totaling 4,200 workers and 100,000 person days.

The March 2011 earthquake and tsunami will be in the top of the list of natural disasters of the century. The tsunami created more than 90% of the total debris in this disaster. In addition to clearing the debris created in the disaster, daily waste removal also continues to be needed to maintain a normal clean living environment. The postdisaster waste (debris) disposal processes are additions to daily waste removal and require a huge amount of focused resources. These resources include space to store, vehicles to transport, tools and people to collect, and equipment to process debris. Government policies established to handle the debris were very well thought out and did help to speed recovery. To reduce the amount of damage in future events, devices could be developed, designed, and installed in parking spaces for owners of cars to anchor their cars during tsunami warnings.

Significant damage to transportation infrastructure due to the 2011 Japan earthquake caused large reductions in the availability and mobility of medical personnel. This damage to critical infrastructure lifelines caused numerous healthcare facilities to lose significant functionality, and many hospitals could provide only reduced services. Based on the lessons learned from the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (a.k.a. Kobe Earthquake), Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare requested that each prefecture designate and equip specific hospitals as disaster emergency response hospitals, according to the strategic medical needs of each prefecture. On the day of the 2011 event, 147 of the 170 hospitals designated for disaster emergency response were fully operational in Tokyo and Tohoku. These designated hospitals functioned well, other than those hospitals hit by the tsunami. The chapter summarizes the number of evacuation centers and the number of evacuees in the affected prefectures.

Over the entire area of Japan affected by the earthquake, 287 fire ignitions were reported, either after the main shock or the larger aftershocks. A report and paper from Japan’s Association for Fire Science and Engineering indicate that almost half of the fires were due to tsunami, hence Fire Following Tsunami (FFT) tends to be the focus of this report. Earthquake caused the remaining ignitions, Fire Following Earthquake (FFE). Two fires occurred in refineries. Inundation caused one fire in the Sendai refinery, and ground shaking contributed to the other fire at Cosmo Refinery, Ichihara, Chiba Prefecture. Isolating the specific causes of fire ignitions in this event is very difficult because the tsunami washed away most of the evidence.

This chapter describes how the tsunami’s impact on transportation slowed the pace of recovery and caused extreme difficulties for rescue and emergency services. In total, the Japanese Self Defense Forces deployed about 100,000 troops from all of its branches to conduct various missions in response to the earthquake and tsunami. Because of the devastation caused by the tsunami, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport and affected local autonomous bodies came to an agreement regarding reconstruction of the damaged tsunami walls. This agreement states that the new tsunami walls shall be designed to withstand tsunamis with longer recurrence intervals. This is part of the latest plan for reconstructing Otsuchi after the 2011 tsunami, which was prepared by a specially convened council.

This chapter is based on data collected from lifeline operators during the 2011 Japan earthquake. Both physical and functional lifeline interdependencies were observed after the disaster occurred. Physical interdependence occurs between transportation networks and communication networks when conduits with fiber optic and copper cables are installed in bridges. Functional dependencies occur when one infrastructure operation depends on another infrastructure to perform a given function in a satisfactory way. For example, transportation infrastructures have an important functional interdependency on electric grids, such as when they require electric power in gas stations to operate the pumps. Another example is trains that are powered from the electric grid. This dependency caused train service interruptions in the Tokyo area immediately after the earthquake.