Technical Papers
Oct 31, 2018

Determining Optimal Capital Structure and Concession Period Length in BOT Scheme Using Trilateral Bargaining Game Model

Publication: Journal of Infrastructure Systems
Volume 25, Issue 1

Abstract

Equity:debt ratio and concession period length are the most important financial variables to consider when analyzing a build-operate-transfer (BOT) agreement. Because the involved parties have conflicting interests regarding these variables, this research introduces a new trilateral bargaining model which helps the BOT participants to model the BOT negotiation process (especially in a procurement process based on direct negotiation) and reach an efficient agreement on the concession period length and equity:debt ratio considering the conflicting interests and different bargaining powers of the sponsor, government, and lender. First, a mathematical interpretation of conflicting financial interests of the parties is introduced. Then the noncooperative and cooperative bilateral bargaining games are combined as a novelty of this research to develop a trilateral bargaining game model enabling consideration of the negotiation process in BOT projects. The proposed model can be used to predict the concession period length and capital structure simultaneously. Finally, the proposed model is implemented in a real-world BOT project and the application and performance of the proposed model are illustrated.

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Data Availability Statement

Data generated or analyzed during the study are available from the corresponding author by request.

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Go to Journal of Infrastructure Systems
Journal of Infrastructure Systems
Volume 25Issue 1March 2019

History

Received: Nov 6, 2017
Accepted: Jul 12, 2018
Published online: Oct 31, 2018
Published in print: Mar 1, 2019
Discussion open until: Mar 31, 2019

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Authors

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Morteza Bayat [email protected]
Ph.D. Candidate, School of Civil Engineering, Iran Univ. of Science and Technology, P.O. Box 16765-163, Narmak, Tehran 1684613114, Iran. Email: [email protected]
Mostafa Khanzadi [email protected]
Associate Professor, School of Civil Engineering, Iran Univ. of Science and Technology, P.O. Box 16765-163, Narmak, Tehran 1684613114, Iran. Email: [email protected]
Farnad Nasirzadeh [email protected]
Senior Lecturer, School of Architecture and Built Environment, Deakin Univ., Geelong, VIC 3220, Australia (corresponding author). Email: [email protected]

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