Case Studies
Apr 25, 2016

Transitional Public–Private Partnership Model in China: Contracting with Little Recourse to Contracts

Publication: Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Volume 142, Issue 10

Abstract

Since 2013, the Chinese government has attempted to make a transition from user-pay public-private partnership (PPP) to government-pay PPP systems with the aim of facilitating infrastructure investment and government transformation. Whereas the application of government-pay PPP systems can considerably expand the areas where PPPs are suitable, the lengthy procurement time experienced in the implementation of similar systems [e.g., private finance initiative (PFI)] presents a tough challenge to Chinese procuring authorities who are under increasing pressure to get the earmarked PPP projects off the ground swiftly in order to stem the downward pressure in the economy. The first PFI-like project in China, the Anqing Urban Road PPP project, has been successfully tendered in May 2015 with an impressive record on procurement time. Through the scrutiny of this project, it is found that speedy procurement is achieved by leaving some of the major risks ill-defined and vaguely allocated in the tender document. However, this apparent high-risk exposure did not deter investors. This research maintains that the greater risk tolerance revealed among state-owned enterprise (SOE) investors should be attributed to the power structure embedded in China’s administrative system. While leveraging this mechanism can reduce transaction costs, it could hold back the participation of private investors in future Chinese PPP projects.

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Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office [Grant number PPY CHN 1587, titled “Promoting Best Practices for the Implementation of Government-Pay Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) Systems in China from the perspective of UK Experiences”].

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Go to Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Volume 142Issue 10October 2016

History

Received: Dec 1, 2015
Accepted: Feb 18, 2016
Published online: Apr 25, 2016
Discussion open until: Sep 25, 2016
Published in print: Oct 1, 2016

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Chen-Yu Chang [email protected]
Lecturer, Bartlett School of Construction and Project Management, Univ. College London, 1-19 Torrington Place, London WC1E 7HB, U.K. (corresponding author). E-mail: [email protected]
Financial Analyst, China Life Wealth Management Company Limited, 17 F China Life Center, No. 17 Financial St., Xicheng District, Beijing 1000033, China. E-mail: [email protected]

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