Attack–Defense Game in Interdependent Networks: A Functional Perspective
Publication: Journal of Infrastructure Systems
Volume 29, Issue 3
Abstract
The normal operation of critical infrastructure is related to the stability of society and a country’s development. Based on game theory and network science, this paper analyzes the attack–defense issues of critical infrastructure, proposing a network attack–defense game model based on virtual flow. Five coupling methods are established according to the complex interdependent characteristics and important evaluation indicators (the degree value and betweenness value) in the network. Considering the network’s information transmission, redistribution, and cascading failures, a cascading failure model based on betweenness virtual flow is established. A two-player game is adopted, in which the attacker and the defender act simultaneously. The scale-free, small-world, and random networks are related using these five coupling methods. Simulation and theoretical analyses are carried out on the interdependent network game scenario under different coupling modes. The game equilibrium under different network coupling conditions and coupling methods is simulated, and the preferences of the game participants are determined. In addition, a sensitivity analysis of the game parameters is conducted, facilitating the identification of certain effective strategies that can support decision-makers.
Practical Applications
Critical infrastructure networks play an important role in maintaining social stability. Based on game theory and network science, this paper analyzed the attack–defense problems of critical infrastructures and proposed an attacker–defender game model based on the betweenness virtual flow. The attack–defense game in the interdependent network is analyzed in terms of coupling modes, network types, and tolerance coefficient. A sensitivity analysis of the game parameters is also conducted. The results show that the interdependent networks under random coupling and reverse coupling strategies are more vulnerable to attack. In addition, the cost-sensitive parameter is a key factor affecting the game equilibrium. Even if the two subnetworks in the interdependent network are the same, the payoffs and the robustness will be different when the order of removing nodes is different. This paper provides decision support for actual infrastructure protection.
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Data Availability Statement
All data, models, and code generated or used during the study appear in the published article.
Acknowledgments
This work is jointly supported by National Natural Science Foundations of China (61801197 and 61503166).
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Published In
Journal of Infrastructure Systems
Volume 29 • Issue 3 • September 2023
Copyright
© 2023 American Society of Civil Engineers.
History
Received: Oct 7, 2022
Accepted: Apr 13, 2023
Published online: Jun 24, 2023
Published in print: Sep 1, 2023
Discussion open until: Nov 24, 2023
ASCE Technical Topics:
- Analysis (by type)
- Business management
- Coupling
- Decision making
- Electric power
- Energy engineering
- Engineering fundamentals
- Engineering mechanics
- Equilibrium
- Failure analysis
- Game theory
- Infrastructure
- Lifeline systems
- Network analysis
- Power transmission
- Practice and Profession
- Sensitivity analysis
- Statics (mechanics)
- Structural engineering
- Structural members
- Structural systems
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