Securing Smart Water Distribution Systems against Deceptive Data Injections: A Chance-Constrained Cyberattack Localization Approach

With the emergence of sensor-based devices, deceptive cyberattacks targeting smart water distribution systems (WDSs) have become substantially frequent. An inherent challenge for water authorities is to localize the susceptible regions of smart WDSs considering demand variability at nodes. To resolve this problem, this paper proposes a novel chance-constrained, cyberattack localization model to identify the susceptible zones of the WDSs that can face the adverse consequences of cyberattacks. The proposed model accounts for variable water demand at nodes, and it is validated with case studies depicting real-world situations. Furthermore, the financial damages from concurrent pipe leakage, hydraulic disturbances, and deception attacks are analyzed. The results reveal that the monetary losses due to cyberattacks have a positive correlation with the underlying leaks and disturbances in the systems. This paper contributes to the enhancement of cybersecurity aspects of the water systems while addressing the susceptibility of the system under uncertainties.