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Dec 9, 2021

Study on Operation and Maintenance Supervision Strategy of Environmental Engineering PPP Project

Publication: ICCREM 2021

ABSTRACT

Because of the significant information asymmetry in the operation and maintenance process of environmental engineering PPP projects, there are great limitations in the supervision of the project by all participants, and the interest demands of all parties are inconsistent, which makes the regulatory strategies of all parties different. Therefore, based on the assumption of bounded rationality, this paper introduces the public feedback mechanism to construct the tripartite evolutionary game income matrix of government departments, social capital, and the public. Based on the matrix, the interaction behavior and stability state of the three parties under different strategies are analyzed, and then the ideal state of the tripartite game is simulated and analyzed to explore the influence of various uncertain factors on the game process, to provide a theoretical basis for the choice of the optimal regulatory strategy of environmental engineering PPP project.

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REFERENCES

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Go to ICCREM 2021
ICCREM 2021
Pages: 708 - 717

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Published online: Dec 9, 2021

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Shuying Qin [email protected]
1Postgraduate, School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Wuhan Univ. of Technology, Wuhan, China. Email: [email protected]
2Professor, School of Civil Engineering and Architecture, Wuhan Univ. of Technology, Wuhan, China. Email: [email protected]
3Senior Engineer, Dept. of Engineering Management, Ningxia Construction Investment Group Corporation, Ningxia, China. Email: [email protected]

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