Evolutionary Game Analysis of Dangerous-Waste Disposal of Major Engineering Enterprises and Government Supervision
Publication: ICCREM 2021
ABSTRACT
The construction environment of major infrastructure projects is complex and difficult to construct, and enterprises are easy to ignore the disposal and management of “hazardous wastes” with great potential harm to environmental pollution during the working hours of the facilities under construction. There is also a lack of regulatory measures and policies. In this paper, the evolutionary game model is used to analyze how to make the insurance company, the construction company, and the government achieve the effective supervision strategy of joint governance and policy supervision under the assumption of bounded rationality. Based on the derivation of evolutionary game theory, the parameters were set and the influence of key parameters on the evolutionary behavior was deduced and verified, which provided an effective supervision strategy for solving the ecological and environmental problems existing in the construction of major engineering projects.
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ICCREM 2021
Pages: 554 - 560
Copyright
© 2021 American Society of Civil Engineers.
History
Published online: Dec 9, 2021
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