Chapter
Sep 25, 2015
Deriving Optimal Competition in Infrastructure Procurement
Authors: Pauline Teo [email protected], Adrian Bridge [email protected], and Peter Love [email protected]Author Affiliations
Publication: ICCREM 2015
Abstract
Typically, only a limited number of consortiums are able to competitively bid for public private partnership (PPP) projects. Consequently, this may lead to oligopoly pricing constraints and ineffective competition, thus engendering ex ante market failure. In addressing this issue, this paper aims to determine the optimal number of bidders required to ensure a healthy level of competition is available to procure major infrastructure projects. The theories of structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm; Game Theory and Auction Theory and transaction cost economics are reviewed and discussed and used to produce an optimal level of competition for major infrastructure procurement, that prevents market failure ex ante (lack of competition) and market failure ex post (due to asymmetric lock-in).
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Published In
ICCREM 2015
Pages: 1114 - 1123
Copyright
© 2015 American Society of Civil Engineers.
History
Published online: Sep 25, 2015
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Affiliations
Research Fellow, Dept. of Civil Engineering, Curtin University, GPO BOX U1987, Perth, WA 6845, Australia. E-mail: [email protected]
Associate Professor, School of Civil Engineering & Built Environment, Queensland University of Technology, QLD 4000, Australia. E-mail: [email protected]
John Curtin Distinguished Professor, Dept. of Civil Engineering, Curtin University, GPO BOX U1987, Perth, WA 6845, Australia. E-mail: [email protected]
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