Effects of Hydrologic Conditions and Reservoir Operation on Transboundary Cooperation in the Lancang–Mekong River Basin
Publication: Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management
Volume 145, Issue 6
Abstract
Multiple stakeholders in transboundary river basins would benefit from cooperation, but how and why stakeholders can achieve this cooperation remains difficult to determine. This paper proposes an approach for analyzing the effect of the cascade reservoir system operation under varying hydrologic conditions on transboundary cooperation, taking the Lancang–Mekong River as a case study. The results demonstrate that the economic gains from cooperation are greater than those from noncooperation, particularly in dry years. The systematic incremental benefits of cooperation increase with the exceedance percentage, , of the flow duration curve, indicating that the dryer the basin, the more benefits cooperation can yield. The operation policies of the cascade reservoir system in China influence the spatial and temporal streamflow patterns in the downstream Mekong River and provide substantial economic benefits to downstream stakeholders in coalitions. When China participates in the cooperation, the cascade reservoirs release more water in dry seasons, leading to hydropower loss upstream, but extra gains at the system level. An interesting free-ride phenomenon in partial coalitions is observed, illustrating the unique character of the transboundary river basin system as a continuum. The shares of the benefit for each stakeholder vary with different cooperative game methods. It is also determined that stakeholders are unlikely to reach a consensus on the preferred solution to benefit sharing, but they will not depart from the grand cooperation if one of the three proposed cooperative game-theory solutions is really implemented.
Get full access to this article
View all available purchase options and get full access to this article.
Acknowledgments
This research was funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (91747208 and 51579129) and the National Key Research and Development Program of China (2016YFC0402203 and 2017YFC0404403).
References
Ai, X., W. Fan, and X. Wang. 2009. “Study on the operation model and distribution of cooperation benefits of cascade reservoirs.” J. Hydroelectr. Eng. 28 (3): 42–46. https://doi.org/10.3390/w10121857.
Asgari, S., A. Afshar, and K. Madani. 2014. “Cooperative game theoretic framework for joint resource management in construction.” J. Constr. Eng. Manage. 140 (3): 04013066. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)CO.1943-7862.0000818.
Bai, T., J. X. Chang, F. J. Chang, Q. Huang, Y. M. Wang, and G. S. Chen. 2015. “Synergistic gains from the multi-objective optimal operation of cascade reservoirs in the Upper Yellow River Basin.” J. Hydrol. 523: 758–767. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2015.02.007.
Bhagabati, S., A. Kawasaki, M. Babel, P. Rogers, and S. Ninsawat. 2014. “A cooperative game analysis of transboundary hydropower development in the lower Mekong: Case of the 3 S sub-basins.” Water Resour. Manage. 28 (11): 3417–3437. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-014-0594-2.
Brook, A., D. Kendrick, and A. Meeraus. 1988. “GAMS, a user’s guide.” ACM Signum Newsletter 23 (3–4): 10–11. https://doi.org/10.1145/58859.58863.
China Daily. 2016. “Leaders of Lancang-Mekong countries convene.” Accessed March 23, 2016. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2016-03/23/content_24045613.htm.
Dinar, A., and S. Alemu. 2000. “The process of negotiation over water disputes: The case of the Nile Basin.” Int. Negot. 5 (2): 331–356. https://doi.org/10.1163/15718060020848794.
Dinar, A., and R. E. Howitt. 1997. “Mechanisms for allocation of environmental control cost: Empirical tests of acceptability and stability.” J. Environ. Manage. 49 (2): 183–203.
Dinar, S. 2002. “Water, security, conflict, and cooperation.” SAIS Rev. 22 (2): 229–253. https://doi.org/10.1353/sais.2002.0030.
Fernandez, L. 2002. “Trade’s dynamic solutions to transboundary pollution.” J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 43 (3): 386–411. https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2001.1187.
Fernandez, L., U. R. Sumaila, A. Dinar, and J. Albiac. 2009. “Wastewater pollution abatement across an international border.” Environ. Dev. Econ. 14 (1): 67–88. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X08004543.
Fisher, F., and A. Huber-Lee. 2008. “WAS-guided cooperation in water: The grand coalition and sub-coalitions.” Environ. Dev. Econ. 14 (1): 89–115. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355770X08004695.
Frisvold, G. B., and M. F. Caswell. 2000. “Transboundary water management: Game-theoretic lessons for projects on the US-Mexico border.” Agric. Econ. 24 (1): 101–111. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1574-0862.2000.tb00096.x.
Ganji, A., D. Khalili, and M. Karamouz. 2007. “Development of stochastic dynamic Nash game model for reservoir operation. I. The symmetric stochastic model with perfect information.” Adv. Water Resour. 30 (3): 528–542. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.advwatres.2006.04.004.
Gately, D. 1974. “Sharing the gains from regional cooperation: A game theoretic application to planning investment in electric power.” Int. Econ. Rev. 15 (1): 195–208.
Harsanyi, J. C. 1959. “A bargaining model for cooperative n-person games.” In Vol. 40 of Contributions to the theory of games, 325–355. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Homayoun-far, M., A. Ganji, D. Khalili, and J. Harris. 2010. “Two solution methods for dynamic game in reservoir operation.” Adv. Water Resour. 33 (7): 752–761. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.advwatres.2010.04.001.
Hui, R., J. R. Lund, and K. Madani. 2016. “Game theory and risk-based leveed river system planning with noncooperation.” Water Resour. Res. 52 (1): 119–134. https://doi.org/10.1002/2015WR017707.
Jacobs, J. W. 2002. “The Mekong River Commission: Transboundary water resources planning and regional security.” Geogr. J. 168 (4): 354–364. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0016-7398.2002.00061.x.
Johnston, R., and M. Kummu. 2012. “Water resource models in the Mekong Basin: A review.” Water Resour. Manage. 26 (2): 429–455. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11269-011-9925-8.
Kilgour, D. M., and A. Dinar. 2001. “Flexible water sharing within an international river basin.” Environ. Resour. Econ. 18 (1): 43–60. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011100130736.
Kucukmehmetoglu, M., and J. M. Guldmann. 2004. “International water resources allocation and conflicts: The case of the Euphrates and Tigris.” Environ. Plann. A 36 (5): 783–801.
Labadie, J. W. 2004. “Optimal operation of multireservoir systems: State-of-the-art review.” J. Water Resour. Plann. Manage. 130 (2): 93–111. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9496(2004)130:2(93).
Li, B. 2010. “Research on the decision making method of the international river water resources development and utilization.” [In Chinese.] Ph.D. thesis, School of Water Resources and Hydropower Engineering, Wuhan Univ.
Li, D., D. Long, J. Zhao, H. Lu, and Y. Hong. 2017. “Observed changes in flow regimes in the Mekong River Basin.” J. Hydrol. 551: 217–232. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2017.05.061.
Liu, C., Y. He, E. Des Walling, and J. Wang. 2013. “Changes in the sediment load of the Lancang-Mekong River over the period 1965–2003.” [In Chinese.] Sci. China Technol. Sci. 56 (4): 843–852. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11431-013-5162-0.
Liu, X., L. Chen, Y. Zhu, V. P. Singh, G. Qu, and X. Guo. 2017. “Multi-objective reservoir operation during flood season considering spillway optimization.” J. Hydrol. 552: 554–563. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2017.06.044.
Loehman, E., J. Orlando, J. Tschirhart, and A. Whinston. 1979. “Cost allocation for a regional wastewater treatment system.” Water Resour. Res. 15 (2): 193–202.
Loucks, D. P., J. R. Stedinger, and D. A. Haith. 1981. Water resource systems planning and analysis. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Loucks, D. P., and E. van Beek. 2005. Water resources systems planning and management: An introduction to methods, models and applications. Paris: UNESCO.
Madani, K. 2010. “Game theory and water resources.” J. Hydrol. 381 (3–4): 225–238. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2009.11.045.
Madani, K., and M. Hooshyar. 2014. “A game theory-reinforcement learning (GT-RL) method to develop optimal operation policies for multi-operator reservoir systems.” J. Hydrol. 519: 732–742. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2014.07.061.
Madani, K., and J. R. Lund. 2012. “California’s Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta conflict: From cooperation to chicken.” J. Water Resour. Plann. Manage. 138 (2): 90–99. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)WR.1943-5452.0000164.
Matalas, N. C. 1967. “Mathematical assessment of synthetic hydrology.” Water Resour. Res. 3 (4): 937–945. https://doi.org/10.1029/WR003i004p00937.
McKinney, D. C., and R. L. Teasley. 2007. “Cooperative game theory for transboundary river basins: The Syr Darya Basin.” In Proc., World Environmental and Water Resources Congress 2007: Restoring Our Natural Habitat, 1–10. Reston, VA: ASCE.
MRC (Mekong River Commission). 2005. Overview of the hydrology of the Mekong Basin. Vientiane, Thailand: MRC.
MRC (Mekong River Commission). 2010. State of the basin report 2010. MRC.
MRC (Mekong River Commission). 2011. Assessment of basin-wide development scenarios. Vientiane, Thailand: MRC.
MRC (Mekong River Commission). 2016. “Mekong River Commission, China discuss joint study.” Accessed May 6, 2016. http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/events/mekong-river-commission-china-discuss-joint-study/.
Myerson, R. B. 1991. “Effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption: A game-theoretic analysis.” Discussion Papers 5 (1): 118–132. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1006.
Pham Do, K. H., H. Folmer, and H. W. Norde. 2001. “Transboundary fishery management: A game theoretic approach.” Int. Game Theory Rev. 17: 1–19.
Read, L., K. Madani, and B. Inanloo. 2014. “Optimality versus stability in water resource allocation.” J. Environ. Manage. 133: 343–354. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2013.11.045.
Renaud, F. G., and C. Kuenzer. 2012. “The water-development nexus: Importance of knowledge, information and cooperation in the Mekong Delta.” In The Mekong Delta system, 445–458. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Springer.
Ringler, C. 2001. “Optimal allocation and use of water resources in the Mekong River Basin: Multi-country and intersectoral analyses.” Ph.D. thesis, Center for Development Research, Bonn Univ.
Ringler, C., and X. Cai. 2006. “Valuing fisheries and wetlands using integrated economic-hydrologic modeling—Mekong River Basin.” J. Water Resour. Plann. Manage. 132 (6): 480–487. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0733-9496(2006)132:6(480).
Rogers, P. 1969. “A game theory approach to the problems of international river basins.” Water Resour. Res. 5 (4): 749–760. https://doi.org/10.1029/WR005i004p00749.
Sadoff, C. W., and D. Grey. 2002. “Beyond the river: The benefits of cooperation on international rivers.” Water Policy 4 (5): 91–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1366-7017(02)00035-1.
Schmiedler, D. 1969. “The nucleolus of a characteristic function game.” SIAM J. Appl. Math. 17 (6): 1163–1170.
Shapley, L. S. 1953. “A value for n-person games.” In Vol. 28 of Annual mathematics study, 307–318. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Teasley, R. L. 2009. “Evaluating water resource management in transboundary river basins using cooperative game theory: The Rio Grande/Bravo Basin.” Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Civil Engineering, Univ. of Texas at Austin.
Teasley, R. L., and D. C. McKinney. 2011. “Calculating the benefits of transboundary river basin cooperation: The Syr Darya Basin.” J. Water Resour. Plann. Manage. 137 (6): 481–490. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)WR.1943-5452.0000141.
Tennant, D. L. 1976. “Instream flow regimes for fish, wildlife, recreation and related environment resources.” Fisheries 1 (4): 6–10. https://doi.org/10.1577/1548-8446(1976)001%3C0006:IFRFFW%3E2.0.CO;2.
Wolf, A. T., J. A. Natharius, J. J. Danielson, B. S. Ward, and J. K. Pender. 1999. “International river basins of the world.” Int. J. Water Resour. Dev. 15 (4): 387–427. https://doi.org/10.1080/07900629948682.
Wu, X., and D. Whittington. 2006. “Incentive compatibility and conflict resolution in international river basins: A case study of the Nile Basin.” Water Resour. Res. 42 (2): W02417. https://doi.org/10.1029/2005WR004238.
Xu, C., C. Hu, X. Liu, and S. Wang. 2017. “Information entropy in predicting location of observation points for long tunnel.” Entropy 19 (7): 332. https://doi.org/10.3390/e19070332.
Xu, Z., A. Schumann, and J. Li. 2003. “Markov cross-correlation pulse model for daily streamflow generation at multiple sites.” Adv. Water Resour. 26 (3): 325–335. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0309-1708(02)00172-0.
Yu, P. S., and T. C. Yang. 2000. “Using synthetic flow duration curves for rainfall-runoff model calibration at ungauged sites.” Hydrol. Process. 14 (1): 117–133. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-1085(200001)14:1%3C117::AID-HYP914%3E3.0.CO;2-Q.
Zhao, T., D. Yang, X. Cai, J. Zhao, and H. Wang. 2012. “Identifying effective forecast horizon for real-time reservoir operation under a limited inflow forecast.” Water Resour. Res. 48 (1). https://doi.org/10.1029/2011WR010623.
Zhao, T., and J. Zhao. 2014. “Improved multiple-objective dynamic programming model for reservoir operation optimization.” J. Hydroinf. 16 (5): 1142–1157. https://doi.org/10.2166/hydro.2014.004.
Zhao, T., J. Zhao, D. Yang, and H. Wang. 2013. “Generalized martingale model of the uncertainty evolution of streamflow forecasts.” Adv. Water Resour. 57: 41–51. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.advwatres.2013.03.008.
Zhou, Y., S. Guo, C. Y. Xu, P. Liu, and H. Qin. 2015. “Deriving joint optimal refill rules for cascade reservoirs with multi-objective evaluation.” J. Hydrol. 524: 166–181. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2015.02.034.
Information & Authors
Information
Published In
Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management
Volume 145 • Issue 6 • June 2019
Copyright
©2019 American Society of Civil Engineers.
History
Received: Jan 5, 2018
Accepted: Nov 15, 2018
Published online: Mar 26, 2019
Published in print: Jun 1, 2019
Discussion open until: Aug 26, 2019
Authors
Metrics & Citations
Metrics
Citations
Download citation
If you have the appropriate software installed, you can download article citation data to the citation manager of your choice. Simply select your manager software from the list below and click Download.