Technical Papers
May 31, 2018

Government Cost of Extending Concession Term Rights

Publication: Journal of Infrastructure Systems
Volume 24, Issue 3

Abstract

A widespread practice used in concession-based public private–partnerships (PPPs) arrangements consists of granting the concessionaire the right, under certain circumstances, to extend the concession term under a build-operate-finance-transfer (BOFT) arrangement. The asset involved in the project becomes the property of the government on its transfer. Thus, extending the concession period means an opportunity cost for the host government. By using an option-pricing model, this paper proposes a methodology for valuing the impact on the public budget arising from this option. This method can be of use in different transportation infrastructure projects, such as motorways, tunnels, and bridges. A case study is provided to show how the proposed methodology can be applied. The results confirm that the opportunity cost for the government may be high, and the main drivers behind this cost are the extension period, the base interest rates, and the risk premium of the government.

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Go to Journal of Infrastructure Systems
Journal of Infrastructure Systems
Volume 24Issue 3September 2018

History

Received: Jan 13, 2017
Accepted: Feb 6, 2018
Published online: May 31, 2018
Published in print: Sep 1, 2018
Discussion open until: Oct 31, 2018

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Authors

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Carlos Contreras [email protected]
Associate Professor, Dept. of Applied Economics, Public Economics and Political Economy, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Campus Somosaguas, Edificio 6, Pozuelo de Alarcón, Madrid 28223, Spain (corresponding author). Email: [email protected]
Julio Angulo [email protected]
International Centre for Infrastructure Solutions, ICIS Group, Calle del Valle del Ebro 8, Urbanización las Lomas, Boadilla del Monte, Madrid 28669, Spain. Email: [email protected]

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