Engineers hold the keys needed to inform the public about the seriousness of an impending crisis. The monumental effort that will be required to rebuild the constructed fabric of the United States is about to be forced on us and will be painful. While the wheels of government start to turn slowly in response to the increasingly obvious neglect, some elements of our infrastructure are dangerously deteriorated and need immediate action to protect lives. The community of engineers—practicing and retired—are a logical and informed resource. This is a privileged group endowed with a unique understanding of Mother Nature’s behavior by virtue of a special education and experience. It is proposed in this article that individuals and/or groups in the community of engineers identify obvious examples of infrastructure that are dangerous, and then explain their condition to the public. The engineering code of ethics demands no less. Monitoring and regulating functions are normally entrusted to government. Long-term neglect caused by misguided priorities, however, has resulted in a breakdown of the insurance of safety society takes for granted. Government agencies and corporate entities are failing in their responsibilities. This article documents my personal effort to uncover the true dangerous condition of two bridges in my community. Both bridges are owned by CSX Railroad: one is a road bridge over CSX tracks; the other is a CSX rail bridge with a road below. As a result of this effort, the road bridge has been closed but not replaced. Both, however, still pose a danger to the public and the environment. Suggestions are presented to facilitate quick action by the engineering community on other structures in danger of imminent collapse, and thereby seize an important leadership opportunity.
Think globally, act locally is a mantra that seems to reflect the effectiveness of an individual, local effort to get action relative to the danger posed by two seriously deteriorated bridges. The bridges, constructed in 1924 and owned by CSX Railroad, are located in Stuyvesant, New York, close to the Hudson River and southeast of Albany. The Schoolhouse Road bridge carries traffic over the rail line. A few miles north, the bridge over Ridge Road carries CSX freight trains. The subject rail line parallels the Hudson River and is rising in elevation as it makes its way toward the great Hudson River railroad bridge in Castleton. The Hudson River bridge, one of the magnificent pieces of engineering from the early 1900s, is also sadly neglected and may be beyond saving.
Unbelievable Decay Revealed
In August 2007, I incredulously observed the severely deteriorated condition of the Schoolhouse Road bridge, noting continuous rust-through penetrations in the girder webs for the approximate two-hundred-foot total length of the three spans (see Figures 1–3). Returning for subsequent visits to inspect the structure more thoroughly, I found all elements of the deep plate girders as well as secondary beams below the road surface to have similar rust-through holes. Later, I inspected the railroad bridge over Ridge Road a few miles north (also a plate girder structure with a forty-foot span) and it found to have a similar level of deterioration (see Figures 4–6). The following, taken from a published letter in the April Civil Engineering Magazine (Clark 2008), summarizes the findings:
The two subject bridges in Stuyvesant, New York, are extreme examples of neglect. They are both so rusted that large pieces have separated from flanges, webs, and stiffeners, and fallen to the ground. These bridges are both CSX Railroad Bridges, and were built in 1924. One of them, (now closed), carries Schoolhouse Road over the railroad tracks. The other (still in service) carries CSX freight trains over Ridge Road.
The Schoolhouse Road bridge was only shut down this past October. Newspaper articles called attention to the immediate danger, causing the New York Department of Transportation (DOT) to recommend closing it. DOT, however, had been inspecting this bridge every year and reporting “no further investigation needed.” The nearby Ridge Road bridge, which is similarly rusted through, remains open to rail traffic only because it is completely controlled by the CSX Railroad and apparently not subject to DOT inspections, or any known inspection process. The consequences of collapse of this bridge and train derailment involve not only potential loss of life but also possible contamination of the adjacent Hudson River close to the tracks.
Following my initial inspections, I contacted town of Stuyvesant officials and advised them of the seriousness and danger posed by these two structures. The officials, while concerned, seemed unable to come up with an effective course of action, based on the opinion of an individual. Even with a small local government, the mills grind slowly, and require a lot of pressure to drive them. It was concluded that the most effective way to bring the imminent danger issue to light was a newspaper article. The Independent responded quickly, sending a reporter to the bridges with me to collect information. A front-page article with revealing photos resulted (Green 2007).
Fig. 1. Schoolhouse Road CSX bridge, showing continuous rust-through web penetrations, south girder
Fig. 2. Schoolhouse Road CSX bridge, rust-through flange hole, south girder, east end at bearing
Fig. 3. Schoolhouse Road CSX bridge, rust-through holes in web and stiffeners, north girder
Fig. 4. CSX bridge over Ridge Road, web rust-through holes visible
Fig. 5. CSX bridge over Ridge Road, several intermediate beams at south abutment bearing showing separated flanges
Fig. 6. CSX bridge over Ridge Road, typical view of south abutment bearing, showing flange and stiffener corrosion damage
The story was picked up by another local paper, The Register Star (Toal 2007), and a number of articles followed in both papers. In addition, the local public radio station, WAMC, aired a phone interview with me on September 18, 2007.
The visibility given to the dangerous condition of the two bridges caused the town of Stuyvesant to request a special inspection by New York Department of Transportation (NYDOT). Current responsibilities in New York State have NYDOT inspecting only road bridges. Bridges carrying rail lines, however, are totally in the hands of the railroad (in this case, CSX, even though they usually pass above public roads). All relevant information for any railroad bridge is protected by the railroad and not available to the public. In a CSX response to a request for information about the Ridge Road rail bridge from the town of Stuyvesant, R. P. Garro, assistant chief engineer (personal communication, Feb. 1, 2008) stated: “Because of the vast number of jurisdictions through which we operate, and due to the sensitivity and business proprietary nature of this information, CSX is unable to release maintenance records to the town.”
In the same letter, Garro (CSX) states:
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“CSX Transportation recently inspected the bridge and deemed it safe for rail operations; [and]
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The Federal Railroad Administration recently inspected the bridge and determined that it is safe for rail operations.”
With increasing public visibility of the dangerous bridge conditions, NYDOT sent a special inspection crew to the Schoolhouse Road bridge. The Independent printed the following: “[A] sixty-page report on the Schoolhouse Road highway bridge had finally been received from the state NYDOT. It shows the bridge, which the NYDOT closed immediately after a five-hour inspection [on] September 21, is ‘not in good shape.’”
The 2007 report includes findings from an additional one-hour inspection in November, after the bridge was already closed to traffic. It notes that the bridge cannot support the inspection vehicle normally used. “Due to the uncertainty of the structural stability, the heavy inspection vehicle . . . necessary for a full inspection was not permitted on the bridge.”
Hence, NYDOT, when forced to inspect the bridge now having public visibility of the extreme deterioration, invalidated their own previous yearly inspections, which routinely reported that no further investigation was needed. These previous reports make no mention that the members actually have large rust-through holes.
I decided documentation of these findings in order, and wrote an inspection report (Clark 2007). The report was presented to the Mohawk-Hudson Section Board of ASCE. The report contains details of the major defect conditions and also encourages the local section to become involved in similar efforts.
As a follow-up to the refusal of CSX to provide information to the town relative to the Ridge Road bridge, Gordon Davids, chief engineer of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) was contacted (personal communication, February 22, 2008). In this letter, I asked the FRA to validate CSX assertions that FRA concurs with the safety of the Ridge Road bridge, and to release pertinent information. The main points of my letter were as follows:
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“Both of the subject bridges, dangerously corroded, should be demolished and replaced.
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The two bridges are beyond repair. To replace missing pieces and reinforce damaged sections is impossible. The remaining structural elements are too severely rusted to successfully accept welds or bolted connections. Temporarily bracing these bridges to safeguard against dead weight collapse would be impractical and expensive.
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The condition of these two bridges makes an engineering analysis impossible. There are numerous large holes as a result of rust-through and missing pieces at critical locations. Normal engineering assumptions of the continuity of cross-sections could not be made, and hence, true load paths are impossible to determine.
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The [aforementioned] conclusion . . . regarding the impossibility of analysis means that a safe load could not be determined for these structures. We could not therefore even validate safe support for their own dead weight.”
This letter to FRA remains unanswered.
Failure to Safeguard the Public
The failure of our state agencies and corporate entities to adequately safeguard the public against dangerously flawed infrastructure seems clear from the experiences documented above. It is interesting to note here just how and in what format bridge inspections are being performed in New York. Are they useful as an engineering tool? Are they effective in safeguarding the public?
The most recent NYDOT inspection report of November 11, 2006 (prior to closing of the Schoolhouse Road bridge) (NYDOT 2006), was obtained by the town of Stuyvesant and The Independent newspaper. I have reviewed the document and assume that it is typical of yearly reports being performed for bridges across New York. Furthermore, such reports would be expected to be consistent with national recommendations of American Association of State Highway Transportation Officials.
The subject 2006 report contains a listing of numerous structural categories, each with a numerical rating as to the condition of each category, using a scale of one through seven. For example:
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Bearings, bolts, pads 3;
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Footings 5; and
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Seats and pedestals 5.
Above the listing of all such categories is a computed condition rating for the bridge (in this case, 3.627). Presumably, some computer program calculates a weighted average using individual rating values, thus determining an overall condition rating. NYDOT publishes similar condition ratings for all road bridges inspected across New York.
In a subsequent page of the report, under the heading “problems requiring action,” we see the conclusion “No further investigation needed.”
Relevant questions for such inspection reports include: (1) How are rating numerical values obtained? and (2) Does such a system have any quantitative engineering value (i.e., can they be used to determine a safe load?)?
In response to the first of these questions, such values clearly are purely qualitative. Perhaps a dartboard or the roll of dice is used. Field inspectors must come up with a value based on experience with many other such structures in accordance with some general criteria. The only value for the resulting condition rating would then simply be for a ranking relative to many others of similar type. The illusion of accuracy created by three decimal places is nothing more than that—an illusion. One also wonders just how, for example, a ranking number is obtained for “footings” when such footings are subsurface. Bear in mind also that in this report for the Schoolhouse Road bridge, no mention at all is made of the fact that all elements of the two supporting plate girders contain numerous fist-sized holes (Figures 1–3). This omission for the Schoolhouse Road bridge is absurd. One must also wonder what descriptions are included in the secret CSX report for the Ridge Road bridge (if such reports exist at all) (Figures 4–6).
For the second question previously stated, the answer is obvious, even to persons without an engineering background. An engineering analysis must be performed using specified loading, and then resulting maximum stresses for load combinations should be compared with specified maximum values. A reasonable analysis model relies on accurate minimum values for plate thickness dimensions and assumptions of continuity for elements of a member, as well as continuity between members at connections. The presence of advanced corrosion with numerous pieces rusted away for all members in our Stuyvesant bridges (see Figures 1–6) makes an engineering analysis impossible. It is amazing these bridges are even able to support their own dead weight.
Another serious question here relative to the impossibility of analysis involves posted load limits. The Schoolhouse Road bridge, prior to its closing, was posted with a load limit of ( each lane). How could a safe load of have been determined for such a severely damaged structure? Again, it appears that a dartboard was used as the engineering tool.
What Is an Appropriate Response?
Our government representatives are developing proposals to fund the rebuilding of our nation’s constructed fabric. Obvious infrastructure decay, periodic failures with loss of life, and the commendable efforts of professional groups such as ASCE are driving such efforts, but significant results will progress slowly. We are beginning to position the latest technology that will be needed. An example of this was the recent professional gathering in Baltimore for Federal Highway Administration (FHwA) Accelerated Bridge Construction Conference (Azizinamini 2008). Impressive techniques have been developed to rapidly move new bridges into place with minimal disruption to the flow of road and rail traffic. The United States is clearly lagging behind Asia and Europe in using advanced techniques for rapid construction.
In the midst of this gathering storm, loss of life can be minimized by some early detection of structures in danger of imminent collapse, and having them removed from service. Public agencies, charged with protecting the public are failing as effective monitors. The system has broken down. Our community of trained engineers could be a valuable resource to implement:
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Identification of neglected and seriously deteriorated structures that can be inspected visually without using special equipment;
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Determination of the degree of decay that would make an engineering analysis to determine a safe load impossible; and
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Explaining the condition of structures in such unsafe conditions and enlisting local governments to help remove such structures from service.
The importance of the last point above may not always be clear to informed professionals. I was surprised that many people I questioned about the visible decay in the Schoolhouse Road bridge responded that visible structure above the road surface was simply a handrail and fence to protect people, when in fact such structure (the plate girder) is the primary support for the bridge.
Immediate disruptions caused by necessary actions against dangerous structural conditions will only serve to accelerate desperately needed rebuilding. Public agencies will also be forced to implement more effective inspections, which will in turn encourage maintenance that can avoid irreversible decay.
References
Azizinamini, A. (2008). “2008 accelerated bridge construction: Highway for life conference.” Proceedings, Highway for Life Conference, Federal Highway Administration (FHwA), Baltimore, Md.
Clark, R. W. (2007). “Stuyvesant CSX bridges: Inspection report.” Presented to American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE), Hudson-Mohawk Section Board, Albany, N.Y.
Bob Clark’s structural engineering career, initially in public buildings and bridges, chronologically progressed to Saturn Rocket Booster analysis, Australian automotive structure testing and design, helicopter airframe analysis, and nuclear reactor vessel and piping analysis and design. He is now an associate professor of engineering at a community college, and is a licensed professional engineer in Ohio and New York. He can be reached via e-mail at [email protected].
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