Exogenous Determinants for Renegotiating Public Infrastructure Concessions: Evidence from Portugal
Publication: Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Volume 139, Issue 9
Abstract
Renegotiations are frequently perceived as the Achilles’ heel of concessions. After two decades of concessions development, empirical evidence suggests a recurrent need to renegotiate contracts. What drives renegotiation? Why does it occur? What are the results? The literature still lacks data on renegotiation patterns and on its main causes and results, thus not answering these questions. This paper intends to fulfill this gap by identifying some of the key determinants of renegotiations and presenting the main results. Using an econometric analysis on a real database of 87 Portuguese concessions, the research identified some variables that help explaining the high probability of renegotiation, such as the concession duration and investment, or the existence of a regulator when the contract was signed. The research also found empirical evidence of the high costs involved in renegotiations, as well as of poor control and poor management of concessions by the government.
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Information & Authors
Information
Published In
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Volume 139 • Issue 9 • September 2013
Pages: 1082 - 1090
Copyright
© 2013 American Society of Civil Engineers.
History
Received: Mar 6, 2012
Accepted: Feb 27, 2013
Published online: Mar 1, 2013
Discussion open until: Aug 1, 2013
Published in print: Sep 1, 2013
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