Human Factors Analysis Classification System Relating to Human Error Awareness Taxonomy in Construction Safety
Publication: Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Volume 135, Issue 8
Abstract
In several studies it is widely accepted that human error is the main reason for up to 80% of all incidents and accidents in complex high-risk systems that exist in the aviation, petrochemical, healthcare, construction, mining, and nuclear power industries. The construction industry, greatly impacted by accidents, is accountable for more than 1,000 fatalities in each of the past 14 years. The human factors analysis classification system (HFACS) is a general human error framework originally developed and tested as a tool for investigating and analyzing the human causes of accidents with applications to rail, air, and offshore environments. This paper introduces the concept of HFACS along with the framework of human error awareness training (HEAT) and their potential contribution to the construction industry. Based on the HEAT approach, this paper proposes a new error analysis educational and classification tool for safety within the construction industry. The primary difference between HFACS and HEAT is found in the structure, content, and presentation of the information allowing for higher effectiveness in incident investigation and safety education and training in construction.
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Information & Authors
Information
Published In
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Volume 135 • Issue 8 • August 2009
Pages: 754 - 763
Copyright
© 2009 ASCE.
History
Received: Jul 16, 2008
Accepted: Jan 26, 2009
Published online: Jul 15, 2009
Published in print: Aug 2009
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