Using Bargaining-Game Theory for Negotiating Concession Period for BOT-Type Contract
Publication: Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Volume 133, Issue 5
Abstract
This paper extends the build-operate-transfer (BOT) concession model (BOTCcM) to a new method for identifying a concession period by using bargaining-game theory. Concession period is one of the most important decision variables in arranging a BOT-type contract, and there are few methodologies available for helping to determine the value of this variable. The BOTCcM presents an alternative method by which a group of concession period solutions are produced. Nevertheless, a typical weakness in using BOTCcM is that the model cannot recommend a specific time span for concessionary. This paper introduces a new method called BOT bargaining concession model (BOTBaC) to enable the identification of a specific concession period, which takes into account the bargaining behavior of the two parties concerned in engaging a BOT contract, namely, the investor and the government concerned. The application of BOTBaC is demonstrated through using an example case.
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Acknowledgments
This research was funded by the Research Grant Council of the Hong Kong Special Administration Region, China (Ref. PolyU 5113/03E).
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Information & Authors
Information
Published In
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Volume 133 • Issue 5 • May 2007
Pages: 385 - 392
Copyright
© 2007 ASCE.
History
Received: Apr 1, 2005
Accepted: Nov 30, 2006
Published online: May 1, 2007
Published in print: May 2007
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