Investigating the Role of Executive Intrafirm Alumni Networks in Top Management Fraud: Multilevel Study in China’s Construction Industry
Publication: Journal of Management in Engineering
Volume 40, Issue 2
Abstract
To explore factors that influence the likelihood of committing fraud in the construction industry, this study concentrated on senior executives and tested whether some characteristics at the individual and firm levels have impacts on the likelihood of fraud committed by top management. Based on social network theory, this study first proposes that intrafirm alumni networks may increase the probability of senior executives engaging in corrupt behavior. Then the study explored whether the effect of executives’ alumni networks on their wrongdoings is influenced by external and internal corporate governance measures. To verify the hypotheses, this study collected data on 2,017 senior executives from 118 construction companies in China from 2013 to 2021. Because of the multilevel structure of the data, hierarchical linear modeling was used. The results show that alumni networks have a significant positive effect on top management fraud. The effect is weakened by external auditing, altered by board independence, and strengthened by the size of the board of directors and the size of the supervisory board. This multilevel research contributes to advancing the understanding of managers’ fraudulent behavior within an organization and extends the literature on social networks and corporate governance in the construction industry.
Practical Applications
This study addressed fraud in the construction industry by examining the role of top managers and their social networks. Corporate governance was considered to investigate variations in the impact of social networks on top management fraud across firms. The findings demonstrate that top managers with extensive alumni networks are more susceptible to engaging in fraud, particularly in firms with an overabundance of independent directors, large boards, or non-Big 4 auditing firms. To mitigate this issue in the short term, companies are advised to redesign their corporate hiring policies and governance systems to ensure that preferential treatment based on alumni networks is avoided. Promoting diversity among executives can help maintain a well-balanced top management team. To ensure the appropriate utilization of alumni networks, implementing stringent monitoring by two boards is suggested, through adjustments in board structure, such as enhancing board diversity. In the long term, policymakers should refine company laws and promote the engagement of Big 4 auditing firms. These measures are intended to combat fraud and enhance corporate governance, fostering a more transparent business environment. By implementing these strategies, the construction industry can make significant progress in combating fraud and cultivating a trustworthy business environment.
Get full access to this article
View all available purchase options and get full access to this article.
Data Availability Statement
Some or all data, models, or code that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to acknowledge financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (72101086).
References
Adams, R. B., and P. Funk. 2011. “Beyond the glass ceiling: Does gender matter?” Manage. Sci. 58 (2): 219–235. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1452.
Aharony, J., C. Liu, and A. Yawson. 2015. “Corporate litigation and executive turnover.” J. Corporate Finance 34 (Oct): 268–292. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2015.07.009.
Aiken, L. S., S. G. West, and R. R. Reno. 1991. Multiple regression: Testing and interpreting interactions. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Alkhatib, O. J., and A. Abdou. 2018. “An ethical (descriptive) framework for judgment of actions and decisions in the construction industry and engineering–Part I.” Sci. Eng. Ethics 24 (2): 585–606. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-017-9895-1.
Ameyaw, E. E., E. Pärn, A. P. C. Chan, D. G. Owusu-Manu, D. J. Edwards, and A. Darko. 2017. “Corrupt practices in the construction industry: Survey of Ghanaian experience.” J. Manage. Eng. 33 (6): 05017006. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000555.
Baker, W. E., and R. R. Faulkner. 2004. “Social networks and loss of capital.” Social Networks 26 (2): 91–111. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2004.01.004.
Boso, N., V. M. Story, and J. W. Cadogan. 2013. “Entrepreneurial orientation, market orientation, network ties, and performance: Study of entrepreneurial firms in a developing economy.” J. Bus. Venturing 28 (6): 708–727. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusvent.2013.04.001.
Bruynseels, L., and E. Cardinaels. 2014. “The audit committee: Management watchdog or personal friend of the CEO?” Accounting Rev. 89 (1): 113–145. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-50601.
Bushman, R. M., and A. J. Smith. 2001. “Financial accounting information and corporate governance.” J. Accounting Econ. 32 (1): 237–333. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-4101(01)00027-1.
Charness, G., and U. Gneezy. 2012. “Strong evidence for gender differences in risk taking.” J. Econ. Behav. Organ. 83 (1): 50–58. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.06.007.
Chidambaran, N. K., S. Kedia, and N. Prabhala. 2011. CEO director connections and corporate fraud. New York: Fordham Univ. Schools of Business.
China Finance Information. 2023. “Stock market database.” Accessed November 25, 2023. https://cfi.cn/.
China Securities Regulatory Commission. 2019. “China securities regulatory commission administrative punishment decision (18 responsible personnel including Eco Beauty Co., Ltd., Bada Garden Construction Co., Ltd., Wang Rennian).” [In Chinese.] Accessed July 21, 2023. http://www.csrc.gov.cn/csrc/c101928/c1042435/content.shtml.
Chiu, C.-Y., P. Balkundi, and F. J. Weinberg. 2017. “When managers become leaders: The role of manager network centralities, social power, and followers’ perception of leadership.” Leadersh. Q. 28 (2): 334–348. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2016.05.004.
Cohen, L., A. Frazzini, and C. Malloy. 2008. “The small world of investing: Board connections and mutual fund returns.” J. Polit. Econ. 116 (5): 951–979. https://doi.org/10.1086/592415.
Collins, C. J., and K. D. Clark. 2003. “Strategic human resource practices, top management team social networks, and firm performance: The role of human resource practices in creating organizational competitive advantage.” Acad. Manage. J. 46 (6): 740–751. https://doi.org/10.5465/30040665.
Cooper, D. J., T. Dacin, and D. Palmer. 2013. “Fraud in accounting, organizations and society: Extending the boundaries of research.” Accounting Organ. Soc. 38 (6–7): 440–457. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.aos.2013.11.001.
Damanpour, F. 2010. “An integration of research findings of effects of firm size and market competition on product and process innovations: Product and process innovations.” Br. J. Manage. 21 (4): 996–1010. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2009.00628.x.
Dbouk, W., Y. Fang, L. Liu, and H. Wang. 2020. “Do social networks encourage risk-taking? Evidence from bank CEOs.” J. Finan. Stab. 46: 100708. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2019.100708.
DeAngelo, L. E. 1981. “Auditor size and audit quality.” J. Accounting Econ. 3 (3): 183–199. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4101(81)90002-1.
DeFond, M., and J. Zhang. 2014. “A review of archival auditing research.” J. Accounting Econ. 58 (2–3): 275–326. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2014.09.002.
Delhi, V. S. K., and A. Mahalingam. 2020. “Relating institutions and governance strategies to project outcomes: Study on public–private partnerships in infrastructure projects in India.” J. Manage. Eng. 36 (6): 04020076. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000840.
de Villiers, C., V. Naiker, and C. J. van Staden. 2011. “The effect of board characteristics on firm environmental performance.” J. Manage. 37 (6): 1636–1663. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206311411506.
Ding, S., Z. Wu, Y. Li, and C. Jia. 2010. “Executive compensation, supervisory board, and China’s governance reform: A legal approach perspective.” Rev. Quant. Finance Accounting 35 (4): 445–471. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11156-010-0168-1.
Eisenberg, T., S. Sundgren, and M. T. Wells. 1998. “Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms.” J. Financ. Econ. 48 (1): 35–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00003-8.
Fama, E. F., and M. C. Jensen. 1983. “Separation of ownership and control.” J. Law Econ. 26 (2): 301–325. https://doi.org/10.1086/467037.
Fan, J. P. H., and T. J. Wong. 2005. “Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets? Evidence from East Asia.” J. Accounting Res. 43 (1): 35–72. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-679x.2004.00162.x.
Fan, J. P. H., T. J. Wong, and T. Zhang. 2007. “Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and post-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms.” J. Financ. Econ. 84 (2): 330–357. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.03.008.
Ferris, S. P., M. Jagannathan, and A. C. Pritchard. 2003. “Too busy to mind the business? Monitoring by directors with multiple board appointments.” J. Finance 58 (3): 1087–1111. https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00559.
Filatotchev, I., G. Jackson, and C. Nakajima. 2013. “Corporate governance and national institutions: A review and emerging research agenda.” Asia Pac. J. Manage. 30 (4): 965–986. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10490-012-9293-9.
Firth, M., P. M. Y. Fung, and O. M. Rui. 2007. “Ownership, two-tier board structure, and the informativeness of earnings—Evidence from China.” J. Accounting Public Policy 26 (4): 463–496. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2007.05.004.
Fracassi, C., and G. Tate. 2012. “External networking and internal firm governance.” J. Finance 67 (1): 153–194. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2011.01706.x.
Freeman, L. C. 1978. “Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification.” Social Networks 1 (3): 215–239. https://doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(78)90021-7.
Granovetter, M. 1985. “Economic action and social structure: The problem of embeddedness.” Am. J. Sociol. 91 (3): 481–510. https://doi.org/10.1086/228311.
Griffin, P. A., H. A. Hong, Y. Liu, and J. W. Ryou. 2021. “The dark side of CEO social capital: Evidence from real earnings management and future operating performance.” J. Corporate Finance 68: 101920. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.101920.
Gu, Z., Z. Li, Y. G. Yang, and G. Li. 2019. “Friends in need are friends indeed: An analysis of social ties between financial analysts and mutual fund managers.” Accounting Rev. 94 (1): 153–181. https://doi.org/10.2308/accr-52160.
Guan, Y., L. N. Su, D. Wu, and Z. Yang. 2016. “Do school ties between auditors and client executives influence audit outcomes?” J. Accounting Econ. 61 (2–3): 506–525. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.09.003.
Guo, B. 2009. “The determinants of new venture sustainable development: A corporate governance model-evidence from small and medium listed companies in China.” In Strategic management engineering: Enterprise, environment and crisis, edited by J. Xiaowen, X. Erming, and I. Schneider, 288–295. Chengdu, China: Sichuan University Press.
Hair, J. F., W. C. Black, B. J. Babin, and R. E. Anderson. 2014. Multivariate data analysis. London: Pearson Education.
Hall, A., and B. Wellman. 1985. “Social networks and social support.” In Social support and health, edited by S. Cohen and S. L. Syme, 23–41. San Diego: Academic.
Hambrick, D. C., and P. A. Mason. 1984. “Upper echelons: The organization as a reflection of its top managers.” Acad. Manage. Rev. 9 (2): 193–206. https://doi.org/10.2307/258434.
Hogg, M. A. 2006. “Social identity theory.” In Contemporary social psychological theories, edited by P. J. Burke, 111–136. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Hogg, M. A., and D. J. Terry. 2000. “Social identity and self-categorization processes in organizational contexts.” Acad. Manage. Rev. 25 (1): 121–140. https://doi.org/10.2307/259266.
Hox, J. J., M. Moerbeek, and R. van de Schoot. 2017. Multilevel analysis: Techniques and applications. New York: Routledge.
Huang, R., G. Liu, K. Li, Z. Liu, X. Fu, and J. Wen. 2023. “Evolution of residents’ cooperative behavior in neighborhood renewal: An agent-based computational approach.” Comput. Environ. Urban Syst. 105 (Oct): 102022. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.compenvurbsys.2023.102022.
Jensen, M. C. 1993. “The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems.” J. Finance 48 (3): 831–880. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x.
Jensen, M. C., and W. H. Meckling. 1976. “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure.” J. Financ. Econ. 3 (4): 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X.
Jiang, F., and K. A. Kim. 2015. “Corporate governance in China: A modern perspective.” J. Corporate Finance 32 (Jun): 190–216. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.10.010.
Kish-Gephart, J. J., D. A. Harrison, and L. K. Treviño. 2010. “Bad apples, bad cases, and bad barrels: Meta-analytic evidence about sources of unethical decisions at work.” J. Appl. Psychol. 95 (1): 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0017103.
Klein, K. J., and S. W. J. Kozlowski. 2000. “From micro to meso: Critical steps in conceptualizing and conducting multilevel research.” Organ. Res. Methods 3 (3): 211–236. https://doi.org/10.1177/109442810033001.
Kong, D., J. Xiang, J. Zhang, and Y. Lu. 2019. “Politically connected independent directors and corporate fraud in China.” Accounting Finance 58 (5): 1347–1383. https://doi.org/10.1111/acfi.12449.
Krause, R., and M. Semadeni. 2014. “Last dance or second chance? Firm performance, CEO career horizon, and the separation of board leadership roles.” Strategic Manage. J. 35 (6): 808–825. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2139.
Kuang, Y. F., and G. Lee. 2017. “Corporate fraud and external social connectedness of independent directors.” J. Corporate Finance 45 (Aug): 401–427. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.05.014.
Lander, M. W., J. van Oosterhout, P. Heugens, and J. L. Pruijssers. 2019. “Career stage dependent effects of law firm governance: A multilevel study of professional-client misconduct.” Hum. Relations 72 (9): 1497–1529. https://doi.org/10.1177/0018726718796157.
LeBreton, J. M., and J. L. Senter. 2008. “Answers to 20 questions about interrater reliability and interrater agreement.” Organ. Res. Methods 11 (4): 815–852. https://doi.org/10.1177/1094428106296642.
Lee, C. J., R. Wang, C. Y. Lee, C. C. W. Hung, and S. C. Hsu. 2018. “Board structure and directors’ role in preventing corporate misconduct in the construction industry.” J. Manage. Eng. 34 (2): 04017067. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000593.
Li, H., and P. Chen. 2018. “Board gender diversity and firm performance: The moderating role of firm size.” Bus. Ethics Eur. Rev. 27 (4): 294–308. https://doi.org/10.1111/beer.12188.
Li, V. 2023. “Groupthink tendencies in top management teams and financial reporting fraud.” Accounting Bus. Res. 1–23. https://doi.org/10.1080/00014788.2022.2145555.
Lin, L.-H. 2011. “Cultural and organizational antecedents of Guanxi: The Chinese cases.” J. Bus. Ethics 99 (3): 441–451. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10551-010-0662-3.
Lipton, M., and J. W. Lorsch. 1992. “A modest proposal for improved corporate governance.” Bus. Lawyer 48 (1): 59–77.
Liu, B., Z. Yang, B. Xue, D. Zhao, X. Sun, and W. Wang. 2022. “Formalizing an integrated metric system measuring performance of urban sustainability: Evidence from China.” Sustainable Cities Soc. 79 (Apr): 103702. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scs.2022.103702.
Lombardi, R., M. Cano-Rubio, R. Trequattrini, and G. Fuentes-Lombardo. 2020. “Exploratory evidence on anticorruption activities in the Spanish context: A sustainable governance approach.” J. Cleaner Prod. 249 (Mar): 119424. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jclepro.2019.119424.
Lu, J., and Z. Shi. 2018. “Does improved disclosure lead to higher executive compensation? Evidence from the conversion to IFRS and the dual-class share system in China.” J. Corporate Finance 48 (Feb): 244–260. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.11.004.
Lu, Y., B. Liu, and Y. Li. 2021. “Collaboration networks and bidding competitiveness in megaprojects.” J. Manage. Eng. 37 (6): 04021064. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000961.
McPherson, M., L. Smith-Lovin, and J. M. Cook. 2001. “Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks.” Annu. Rev. Sociol. 27 (1): 415–444. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.27.1.415.
Oh, H., G. Labianca, and M.-H. Chung. 2006. “A multilevel model of group social capital.” Acad. Manage. Rev. 31 (3): 569–582. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.2006.21318918.
Ou, A. Y., J. Seo, D. Choi, and P. W. Hom. 2017. “When can humble top executives retain middle managers? The moderating role of top management team faultlines.” Acad. Manage. J. 60 (5): 1915–1931. https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2015.1072.
Owusu, E. K., A. P. C. Chan, and M. Shan. 2019. “Causal factors of corruption in construction project management: An overview.” Sci. Eng. Ethics 25 (1): 1–31. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-017-0002-4.
Ozkaya, H. E., C. Dabas, K. Kolev, G. T. M. Hult, S. H. Dahlquist, and S. A. Manjeshwar. 2013. “An assessment of hierarchical linear modeling in international business, management, and marketing.” Int. Bus. Rev. 22 (4): 663–677. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ibusrev.2012.10.002.
Ran, G., Q. Fang, S. Luo, and K. C. Chan. 2015. “Supervisory board characteristics and accounting information quality: Evidence from China.” Int. Rev. Econ. Finance 37 (May): 18–32. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2014.10.011.
Raudenbush, S. W., and A. S. Bryk. 2002. Hierarchical linear models: Applications and data analysis methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE.
Rebeiz, K. S. 2001. “Corporate governance and role of CEO in engineering companies.” J. Manage. Eng. 17 (1): 14–23. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)0742-597X(2001)17:1(14).
Shen, W., and C. Lin. 2009. “Firm profitability, state ownership, and top management turnover at the listed firms in China: A behavioral perspective.” Corporate Governance Int. Rev. 17 (4): 443–456. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00725.x.
Shi, W., B. L. Connelly, and W. G. Sanders. 2016. “Buying bad behavior: Tournament incentives and securities class action lawsuits.” Strategic Manage. J. 37 (7): 1354–1378. https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2400.
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1997. “A survey of corporate governance.” J. Finance 52 (2): 737–783. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x.
Shue, K. 2013. “Executive networks and firm policies: Evidence from the random assignment of MBA peers.” Rev. Financ. Stud. 26 (6): 1401–1442. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hht019.
Sparrowe, R. T., R. C. Liden, S. J. Wayne, and M. L. Kraimer. 2001. “Social networks and the performance of individuals and groups.” Acad. Manage. J. 44 (2): 316–325. https://doi.org/10.5465/3069458.
Stiles, P. 2001. “The impact of the board on strategy: An empirical examination.” J. Manage. Stud. 38 (5): 627–650. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6486.00252.
Summers, S. L., and J. T. Sweeney. 1998. “Fraudulently misstated financial statements and insider trading: An empirical analysis.” Accounting Rev. 73 (1): 131–146.
Tian, L., Y. Jiang, and Y. Yang. 2023. “CEO childhood trauma, social networks, and strategic risk taking.” Leadersh. Q. 34 (2): 101618. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2022.101618.
Troy, C., K. G. Smith, and M. A. Domino. 2011. “CEO demographics and accounting fraud: Who is more likely to rationalize illegal acts?” Strategic Organ. 9 (4): 259–282. https://doi.org/10.1177/1476127011421534.
Vafeas, N. 1999. “The nature of board nominating committees and their role in corporate governance.” J. Bus. Finance Accounting 26 (1–2): 199–225. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5957.00253.
Walsh, J. P., and J. K. Seward. 1990. “On the efficiency of internal and external corporate control mechanisms.” Acad. Manage. Rev. 15 (3): 421–458. https://doi.org/10.2307/258017.
Wang, H., J. Wu, Y. Yang, R. Li, and Y. Liu. 2019. “Ownership concentration, identity and firm performance: Evidence from China’s listed firms.” Emerging Mark. Finance Trade 55 (15): 3653–3666. https://doi.org/10.1080/1540496X.2019.1672042.
Wang, Q., T. J. Wong, and L. Xia. 2008. “State ownership, the institutional environment, and auditor choice: Evidence from China.” J. Accounting Econ. 46 (1): 112–134. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jacceco.2008.04.001.
Wang, R., C. J. Lee, S. C. Hsu, and C. Y. Lee. 2018. “Corporate misconduct prediction with support vector machine in the construction industry.” J. Manage. Eng. 34 (4): 04018021. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000630.
Wang, R., C.-J. Lee, S.-C. Hsu, and J.-H. Chen. 2021. “Preventing or encouraging illegal activities by construction firms: Effects of top management team compensation and aspiration-performance discrepancies.” Eng. Constr. Archit. Manage. 28 (6): 1739–1760. https://doi.org/10.1108/ECAM-08-2019-0440.
Wang, R., C.-J. Lee, S.-C. Hsu, S. Zheng, and J.-H. Chen. 2020. “Effects of career horizon and corporate governance in China’s construction industry: Multilevel study of top management fraud.” J. Manage. Eng. 36 (5): 04020057. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000816.
Wang, Z., S. Yao, A. Sensoy, J. W. Goodell, and F. Cheng. 2022. “Learning from failures: Director interlocks and corporate misconduct.” Int. Rev. Financ. Anal. 84 (Nov): 102406. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2022.102406.
Wiersema, M. F., and K. A. Bantel. 1992. “Top management team demography and corporate strategic change.” Acad. Manage. J. 35 (1): 91–121. https://doi.org/10.5465/256474.
Xi, C. 2006. “In search of an effective monitoring board model: Board reforms and the political economy of corporate law in China.” Connecticut J. Int. Law 22 (1): 1–46.
Xiao, J. Z., J. Dahya, and Z. Lin. 2004. “A grounded theory exposition of the role of the supervisory board in China.” Br. J. Manage. 15 (1): 39–55. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2004.t01-1-00399.x.
Yiu, D. W., W. P. Wan, and Y. Xu. 2019. “Alternative governance and corporate financial fraud in transition economies: Evidence from China.” J. Manage. 45 (7): 2685–2720. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206318764296.
Zahra, S. A., R. L. Priem, and A. A. Rasheed. 2005. “The antecedents and consequences of top management fraud.” J. Manage. 31 (6): 803–828. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206305279598.
Zaman, R., N. Atawnah, G. A. Baghdadi, and J. Liu. 2021. “Fiduciary duty or loyalty? Evidence from co-opted boards and corporate misconduct.” J. Corporate Finance 70 (Oct): 102066. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2021.102066.
Zhang, B., Y. Le, B. Xia, and M. Skitmore. 2017. “Causes of business-to-government corruption in the tendering process in China.” J. Manage. Eng. 33 (2): 05016022. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0000479.
Zhang, L., W. Ji, J. Tao, and Q. Wang. 2011. “Who shall leave? How CEO preference and power affect executive turnover in Chinese listed companies.” Corporate Governance Int. Rev. 19 (6): 547–561. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2011.00855.x.
Zhang, S., and Z. Xu. 2022. “Governance for principal–principal relationship in infrastructure public–private partnerships: A case study in China.” J. Manage. Eng. 38 (3): 05022005. https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE)ME.1943-5479.0001025.
Zhou, L., Y. Niu, V. L. Wang, and K. Tang. 2021. “Hustle for survival or bustle for revival: Effects of Guanxi orientation and order of entry for China’s electronic business ventures.” Ind. Mark. Manage. 93 (Feb): 370–381. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.indmarman.2020.04.003.
Information & Authors
Information
Published In
Journal of Management in Engineering
Volume 40 • Issue 2 • March 2024
Copyright
© 2023 American Society of Civil Engineers.
History
Received: Apr 19, 2023
Accepted: Oct 9, 2023
Published online: Dec 13, 2023
Published in print: Mar 1, 2024
Discussion open until: May 13, 2024
ASCE Technical Topics:
- Business management
- Business organizations
- Construction companies
- Construction engineering
- Construction industry
- Construction management
- Data collection
- Engineering fundamentals
- Engineering profession
- Mathematics
- Methodology (by type)
- Organizations
- Political factors
- Practice and Profession
- Probability
- Professional development
- Public administration
- Research methods (by type)
- Social network
- Verification
Authors
Metrics & Citations
Metrics
Citations
Download citation
If you have the appropriate software installed, you can download article citation data to the citation manager of your choice. Simply select your manager software from the list below and click Download.
Cited by
- Ran Wang, Chia-Jung Lee, Shu-Chien Hsu, Exploring the Relationship between CSR Reporting and Corporate Misconduct, Journal of Management in Engineering, 10.1061/JMENEA.MEENG-5960, 40, 5, (2024).