Optimizing the Regulation of Commercial Real Estate Presale Deposits: The Role of Third-Party Regulation and the Design of Government Incentives
Publication: Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Volume 150, Issue 10
Abstract
In recent years, the outbreak of mass loan suspension by homebuyers in China has triggered widespread concern about the regulation of presale deposits for commercial real estate. To optimize the supervision mechanism of presale deposits, the regulatory role of third-party institutions is being considered by local governments. However, the efficacy of third-party regulatory mechanisms is not guaranteed, and rent-seeking behaviors driven by substantial profits may lead to mechanism failures. By constructing evolutionary game models and analyzing system equilibriums under both administrative and third-party regulatory modes, this study investigates the effectiveness of introducing third-party institutions into the regulation of presale deposits for commercial real estate, proposes suggestions to mitigate developer speculative behavior and addresses the design challenges of local government optimal incentive contracts. Findings indicate that under the administrative regulatory mode, overly strict government regulation may inadvertently enhance the covert nature of developer speculation. The introduction of third parties effectively substitutes for government regulation and better suppresses developer speculative motives. In the setting of incentive mechanisms, the intensities of rewards and penalties need to satisfy different optimal solution relationships based on varying initial conditions. When establishing performance evaluation standards, governments should consider the magnitude of reward and penalty intensities to enhance the quality of third-party regulation. Specifically, when reward intensity exceeds penalty intensity, lowering performance evaluation standards is more conducive to achieving the ideal equilibrium of the system. Conversely, raising performance evaluation standards yields superior results. This study provides a comprehensive theoretical analysis and practical recommendations for the regulation of presale deposits in commercial real estate.
Practical Applications
In construction and engineering projects, the regulation of presale deposits is crucial to ensure the orderly progress and timely delivery of projects. Comparing the evolutionary paths of administrative and third-party regulatory modes, this study reveals the feasibility of introducing third-party involvement in presale deposit regulation and the design of incentive contracts for local governments under the third-party regulatory model. First, third-party supervision serves as a clear substitute for administrative regulatory mode, and authorities can strategically replace certain aspects of government supervision with a carefully designed third-party mechanism to enhance the effectiveness of regulatory measures. Second, when introducing third-party involvement in supervision, the government should strike a balance based on factors such as compliance costs, rent-seeking benefits, and benchmark performance standards to ensure that third-party institutions have the incentive for positive compliance without imposing excessive burdens on them. Finally, in setting benchmark performance standards, if the intensity of rewards exceeds the intensity of penalties, it is recommended that the performance evaluation standards be lowered, and conversely, that the performance evaluation standards be raised. The research has a significant theoretical and practical significance for improving regulatory efficiency, ensuring the delivery of projects on schedule, protecting the rights and interests of homebuyers, and promoting the sustainable development of the construction project management industry.
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Data Availability Statement
Some or all data, models, or code that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the National Social Science Fund of China (Grant No. 23XGL027) and the Science and Technology Program of Sichuan Province (No. 24NSFSC0301).
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Published In
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Volume 150 • Issue 10 • October 2024
Copyright
© 2024 American Society of Civil Engineers.
History
Received: Nov 17, 2023
Accepted: May 16, 2024
Published online: Aug 12, 2024
Published in print: Oct 1, 2024
Discussion open until: Jan 12, 2025
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