Design of ''Assessment and Decision Aiding Software for Application in High Risk Fields'' with a Case Study: The Challenger Tragedy

Risk taking is the driving force of innovation and success. Aerospace is one such field where calculated risks are essential for progress. Deciding which are necessary and which are not is often difficult. During the first few decades of the space age, the successes in space travel were seen as the measure of a country's vision, leadership in technology, and national defense. From the Challenger to the Hubble, and most recently the Columbia, the space program has experienced technically avoidable disasters. The issues causing these disasters were known prior to launch and were not given the proper priority or did not reach the appropriate decision-makers in time. Organizational culture drove these decision-making breakdowns. In this redaction, we discuss the role of the organizational culture problems that permitted the Challenger tragedy, and how these problems affect decision-making. The goal of this paper is not to further investigate the technical causes of the disasters, but to understand and address the organizational culture that has permitted them. The focus will be on NASA's culture during the 1980s to understand organizational behavior as it relates to the flow of decision-making through the management structure. We propose solutions, to assess high-risk decision-making and a preliminary design for decision-aiding software that could prove beneficial to organizations exposed to high risk. The design for this computer-aided application is supported by current theories in the value of anonymity within group decision-making. Probability theories were incorporated to understand and design the program. To validate the potential and foresee its limitations, this program is applied as a case study to the Challenger Tragedy.