Impact of Politics on the Colorado River Basin Water Agreement: In-Depth Administrative Analysis
Publication: Leadership and Management in Engineering
Volume 6, Issue 2
Abstract
The goal of the Colorado River Compact was simple: equitable water allocation amongst the seven participating states: California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, Wyoming, and New Mexico. In the years since the compact was put into effect there has been considerable debate over whether this goal was achieved. This debate has been exacerbated by lawsuits between the participating states, media attention, and intensified citizen and lobbyist pressures on government agencies and officials. In recent years, this controversy has become even more prevalent with record population growth and drought alert in participating lower basin states.
Many political factors impacted the development of the Colorado River Compact (now known as the Colorado River Basin Water Agreement, or CRBWA). These political factors included politicians, political agencies, legislation, and political pressure groups/lobbyists. This paper will present an in-depth administrative analysis of the impact of politics on the CRBWA. It will include historical and theoretical research, as well as interviews with present-day politicians in order to answer questions relating to the impact of politics on the original agreement. Some of the major questions asked were: What politics impacted the CRBWA and how did they affect its creation? Has the agreement achieved its goals and mission? Why or why not? What changes could be made to the CRBWA to help achieve the agreement’s mission and goals?
There are several lessons to be learned from the CRBWA for public administration. Politics will always be present in government: there is no way to completely separate it from administration. But as Nelson Mandela said, “It is one thing to find fault with an existing system, it is another thing altogether, a more difficult task, to replace it with another approach that is better.” By utilizing research, analysis, and interviews, recommendations have been formulated that will minimize the impact of politics on the agreement and assist in the attainment of the goals of the CRBWA (equitable water division and removal of interstate controversy). Recommendation one: Allow for periodic review of the agreement, taking into account shifts in population and water usage. Recommendation two: Utilize historical, scientific water data and trends to take a more scientific approach to water allocation calculations. Recommendation three: Lessen the priority of agricultural industry and place the emphasis back on human population and water consumption needs. Recommendation four: Pay more consideration to environmental issues. Recommendation five: Address water allocation changes in times of drought and periods of shortage. Recommendation six: Utilize groundwater models (as in the Republican River Compact) in order to calculate and allocate water. The goal of the Colorado River Compact was simple: equitable water allocation amongst the seven participating states: California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, Wyoming, and New Mexico. In the years since the compact was put into effect there has been considerable debate over whether this goal was achieved. This debate has been exacerbated by lawsuits between the participating states, media attention, and intensified citizen and lobbyist pressures on government agencies and officials. In recent years, this controversy has become even more prevalent with record population growth and drought alert in participating lower basin states.
Many political factors impacted the development of the Colorado River Compact (now known as the Colorado River Basin Water Agreement, or CRBWA). These political factors included politicians, political agencies, legislation, and political pressure groups/lobbyists. This paper will present an in-depth administrative analysis of the impact of politics on the CRBWA. It will include historical and theoretical research, as well as interviews with present-day politicians in order to answer questions relating to the impact of politics on the original agreement.
Background
In the early twentieth century, western states were experiencing a boom in growth. Interest in Colorado River development as an environmental resource increased considerably, with focus shifting from navigating the river to harnessing it as a power source. In 1916, the state of Wyoming, in partnership with the United States Reclamation Service (now called the Bureau of Reclamation), conducted a study of the Green River, a major tributary of the Colorado River, to determine possible uses. This prompted other western states to follow suit.
To protect Nevada’s interest in the river, Governor Emmet Boyle created the Commission on Colorado River Development (now called the Colorado River Water Commission) in 1920. The panel originally consisted of seven citizens and state engineer James Scrugham. This commission gathered information on plans being considered for water storage and the generation of electrical power at Boulder Canyon. Meanwhile, other western state officials were discussing the potential for allocating the water of the Colorado, which evolved into a plan for the Colorado River Compact.
In 1922, Congress began considering the Boulder Canyon Bill (or Swing-Johnson Bill), which proposed the construction of a high dam on the Colorado to primarily benefit agriculture in California. This heightened fears that California, supported by the Reclamation Service, would acquire a disproportionate share of Colorado River water. These fears made the interstate compact even more urgent.
That same year, representatives of the seven western states (California, Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Arizona, Wyoming, and New Mexico) met in Santa Fe, New Mexico. The federal representative in this meeting was Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover, who was elected as permanent chairman of the Colorado River Commission. On November 24, 1922, the delegates agreed upon the original version on the Colorado River Compact, which was taken back to the participating states for ratification.
The compact divided the Colorado River Basin into upper and lower regions, with the lower basin including the river and its tributaries in Nevada, California, and Arizona. Per the compact, the upper basin states received 7.5 million-acre feet of water per year and the lower basins received from 7.5 million to 8.5 million-acre feet of water per year. Mexico also received an allowance for water.
Current situation
In the past ten years, the CRBWA has been under increased scrutiny from citizens, politicians, agencies, and the media. There are several reasons for this. First, Arizona and Nevada have experienced phenomenal growth in the past two decades: they are two of the fastest growing states in the nation. Second, in the last five to ten years there has been increased public interest in the environment, leading to increased media attention and public criticism of water allocations administered by the agreement. Finally, the lower basin states are currently in a drought alert status. This status is directly impacted by the amount of water allocated by the Colorado River Basin Water Agreement.
Analysis
This analysis will focus on the original agreement in order to define what politics impacted the CRBWA and how they affected its creation. Additionally, we will focus on the compact’s mission and goals in order to ascertain if the agreement achieved its goals and mission and why or why not.
Many political factors were involved in the development of the Colorado River Compact. A PEST analysis (Quick MBA Strategic Management 2004) is often conducted to determine environmental factors influencing businesses and organizations. PEST’s definition for political factors will assist us in identifying the political factors that influenced the creation of the original agreement. Using the definition for “political factors” in this type of analysis, there are three primary categories: (1) politicians and political agencies; (2) impacting legislation; and (3) political pressure groups/lobbyists.
Politicians/Political Agencies
There were many politicians and agencies involved in the development of the CRBWA. Several of the more prominent politicians/agencies involved in its creation and development have been identified for discussion here: Herbert Hoover, Calvin Coolidge, Emmet Boyle, Harry Chandler, George Maxwell, Frederick Newell, the Colorado River Commission, and the Bureau of Reclamation.
Herbert Hoover
Many historians agree that Herbert Hoover had the most impact of any politician on the development of the CRBWA. Originally serving as the Secretary of Commerce and Colorado River Water Commission Chairman, he was later elected as President of the United States.
Hoover was the driving force behind the creation of the CRBWA. He spoke for the federal government on the Colorado River Commission, and concurred with President Coolidge that the development of the river was very important to the recovery of the United States economy. Mr. Hoover also had higher political aspirations that would be affected by the success or failure of both the enactment of the CRBWA and the construction of the dam.
Calvin Coolidge
In his role as president of the United States, Calvin Coolidge signed the Swing-Johnson Bill into law in 1928, which approved the Colorado River Compact. He also appointed Herbert Hoover as his Secretary of the Department of Commerce. President Coolidge’s top priority was to help the nation recover from the War. In his fourth annual message to the nation given in December 1926, three of his top priorities were identified as agriculture, water resources, and reclamation. He equated all three of these as being intimately tied to the nation’s economy and recovery. For this reason, he supported the development and allocation of the Colorado River’s water resources.
It is also notable that President Coolidge was in favor of reducing governmental intervention and bureaus. He said, “[U]nless locality rises to its own requirements, there is an almost irresistible impulse for National Government to intervene…such action should only be adopted as a last resort.”
From these statements taken from the fourth annual message to the nation, it can be inferred that President Coolidge believed in pushing power down to the states, and that he favored a “hands-off” approach to the creation of the CRBWA.
In Herbert Kaufman’s “Administrative Decentralization and Political Power,” he stated that “the administrative history of our governmental machinery can be construed as a succession of shifts…each brought about by a change in emphasis among three values: representativeness, politically neutral competence, and executive leadership.” In the case of the CRBWA, the nation was undergoing a phase of politically neutral competence, with the federal government trying to take a hands-off approach. In taking this hands-off approach, Coolidge hoped to achieve Pareto Optimality: the best that can be achieved without disadvantaging at least one group. We will find out later in this analysis if he was successful.
Emmet Boyle
To look after Nevada’s water interests, Nevada Governor Emmet Boyle created the Commission on Colorado River Development in 1920. This committee was to be responsible for gathering engineering estimates and information on plans being considered for water storage, proposing legislation, and assisting the state and other enterprises that were considering projects along the river.
Governor Boyle wasn’t known as a visionary but when he believed the public supported a certain issue he fought for them (NSLA Archives and Records 2004). Governor Boyle also was viewed as a progressive who wanted to move Nevada’s economy focus away from gaming and divorce. Finally, Governor Boyle was in office when Nevada was beginning to experience a boom in growth and he knew this boom would continue into the future.
Harry Chandler
Harry Chandler was probably one of the most influential citizens in the Southwest (Reisner 1986, p. 125). His extreme wealth was earned in the newspaper industry, as well as the development of the San Fernando Valley in California. He was extremely supportive of the compact and the pending construction of the dam.
George Maxwell
George Maxwell was founder of the National Irrigation Association. He felt that “the extravagance or stupidity or incompetence of local irrigation directors” had left little beyond a legacy of “waste and disaster.” He was politically opposed to Harry Chandler.
A lobbyist, publicist, and journalist for the causes of reclamation and a unified, federally administered water policy, George Maxwell played an important part in the development of United States water conservation. In 1941, the National Reclamation Association named George Maxwell the “Father of Reclamation.” George Maxwell also played an important role in Arizona water development.
Frederick Newell
Frederick Newell was the chief hydrographer with the United States Geological Survey. Surveying the arid lands of the West, he saw firsthand how homesteaders had difficulty finding water to irrigate their lands. The original Reclamation Service was organized within the Geological Survey under his direction as chief engineer. It became a separate Interior bureau under Newell’s direction in 1907 and was retitled the Bureau of Reclamation in 1923.
Bureau of Reclamation
The Bureau of Reclamation’s mission was to “manage, develop, and protect water and related resources in an environmentally and economically sound manner in the interest of the American public.” One of the original responsibilities of this agency was to provide engineering information and estimates for use in the CRBWA. The estimates were for water flow, as well as current and future agricultural acreage in the participating states. Since the bureau was a federal organization, we can assume that its political power was exerted in a manner similar to the federal government: power should be shifted to the states and the government should only step in when localities could not solve their own disagreements.
Colorado River Commission
In 1921, the Colorado River Commission was formed with representatives from each of the seven basin states and Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover speaking for the federal government as the group’s chairman. Nine meetings of the commission failed to resolve the water dispute. Finally in 1922, a fifteen-day session broke the stalemate and resulted in the Colorado River Water Compact. Because Herbert Hoover was Chairman, he was a driving force behind the agreement. His primary interest was for the agreement to be signed, because ultimately the federal government wanted the agriculture and the economy to benefit from the use of the Colorado River.
Impacting Legislation
The CRBWA had been ratified by all but one of the participating states in 1923. Arizona was the lone holdout, so the compact had not yet taken effect. The Boulder Canyon Project Act, or Swing-Johnson Bill, was introduced to finalize the agreement. Two California legislators introduced the bill: Congressman Phil Swing and Senator Hiram Johnson. In 1928, the Boulder Canyon Project Act was passed. The legislation approved the CRBWA, authorized the construction and operation of the dam, and created an advisory board.
Political Pressure Groups/Lobbyists
By far, Imperial Valley farmers held more political power than any other agriculture group involved in the CRBWA because of their wealth and the economic impacts that their activities produced. In most cases, a farmer in this area may earn up to ten times more than farmers in the other participating states. Additionally, it usually cost far less to irrigate acreage in the Imperial Valley because the area lies at sea level. Finally, Imperial Valley farmers were able to pay enough for water to allow the government to recoup its investment in irrigation infrastructure (Reisner 1986, p. 132).
Mission and goals
The primary mission and goals of the compact are specifically outlined in Article I of the CRBWA: (1) provide for the equitable division and apportionment of the use of the waters of the Colorado River System; (2) establish the relative importance of different beneficial use of water; (3) promote interstate comity; (4)remove causes of present and future controversies; and (5) secure the expeditious agricultural and industrial development of the Colorado River Basin, the storage of its waters, and the protection of life and property from floods.
How well has the agreement attained its objectives? Of the objectives outlined, “equitable division and apportionment” seems to be the most controversial.
Equitable Division and Apportionment
Five Principles of Equity
In Ingram et al.’s book New Courses for the Colorado River (1986) there are five principles of equity: (1) reciprocity—distributive advantages and costs should be shared by all members of the relevant community; (2) value-pluralism—users’ rights to employ water to pursue whatever values they consider legitimate should be respected, provided use does not degrade the resource or harm others; (3) accommodation—members of society having claims consistent with other stated values should always be accommodated in resource allocation and in the decision process; (4) good faith—the obligation to obey promises agreed to in good faith in the course of negotiation and compromise; and (5) future—the present use of water resources should take account of future generations.
In Herbert Hoover’s “Analysis of the Compact” printed in the Congressional Records, January 30, 1923, he discussed how the apportionments were calculated. It is very interesting to note that in his analysis, Hoover himself noted that “the commissioners and engineering staffs of the different States varied somewhat from the basic estimates of the Reclamation Service, and some compromise from these figures was agreed to by the commission.” This statement has ramifications for the “accommodation” requirement in Ingram’s definition of “equity.”
The Boulder Canyon Project Act and the CRBWA stipulated the following apportionments: Upper Basin (Colorado, Wyoming, New Mexico, and Utah) and the Lower Basin (Arizona, California, Nevada) receive a total of 7.5 million AF per year. The Lower Basin apportionments are: Arizona (2.8 million AF), California (4.4 million AF), and Nevada (.3 million AF). The following are some of the total acreages indicated in the compact: Arizona (1,147,000), California (940,000), and Nevada (40,000). If California’s acreage was less than Arizona’s, why was the apportionment for California almost twice as large? This question directly relates to the “reciprocity” section of Ingram’s definition of equity.
Finally, why was agriculture acreage used as the basis for apportionment calculations, while population wasn’t a factor? This has ramifications on the “future” section of Ingram’s definition.
Doctrine of Equitable Apportionment
Where two states have a conflict over water rights, the Constitution provides the Supreme Court with the authority to have jurisdiction over controversies between states. Where the laws of the states differ, the Court does not have to rule consistently with local law. Instead, equity is stressed over local rules (Erhardt 1992, p. 213).
The “Doctrine of Equitable Apportionment” resulted from the Court’s ruling in the case of Kansas v. Colorado in 1907. Kansas brought suit in the Supreme Court to prevent Colorado from diverting waters from the Arkansas River, and the case necessitated the development of the Court’s philosophy of equitable apportionment. The philosophy of the doctrine is that “interstate allocation decisions should be based on notions of fairness and practicality, rather than from deriving from inflexible rules or from the potentially inappropriate precedents and arrangements found in state water law.” Ingram’s five principals of equity and the Supreme Court’s “Doctrine of Equitable Apportionment” both call into question whether the CRBWA’s water apportionments were equitable for the participating states.
Discussion and recommendations
The question of whether or not the CRBWA’s water apportionments are equitable is debatable. But are there other ways that the agreement could be improved? In order to answer this question, interviews have been conducted with some of the key players responsible for the present-day administration of the Colorado River Basin Water Agreement. One of the greatest benefits of these personal interviews from a balanced perspective was to collect recommendations for improvements to the agreement.
In order to conduct a balanced analysis, interviewees from each of the states participating in the CRBWA were solicited. Research was conducted in order to solicit recognized “experts” in water, specifically focusing on agencies that are affected by the agreement. Originally, three experts were solicited from each state participating in the compact, as well as an “unbiased” participant from the United States Bureau of Reclamation.
The experts that responded to the interview request are: Mr. Kurt Segler (director of the City of Henderson Department of Utility Services, president of the Colorado River Water Users Association, and registered Nevada Professional Engineer), Ms. Pat Mulroy (general manager of the Southern Nevada Water Authority), Councilwoman Amanda Cyphers (City of Henderson Councilman and president of the Southern Nevada Water Authority Board), Mr. David Merritt (chief engineer for the Colorado River Water Conservation District) and Mr. Robert Walsh (United States Bureau of Reclamation).
The following section is a summary of the interview with Mr. Kurt Segler, which focused on political impacts on the CRBWA and how the agreement could be improved. It is interesting to note that Nevada and Arizona are two of the participating states that are experiencing the fastest rates of growth, as well as two of the states whose representatives are questioning the water apportionments in the agree-ment.
Mr. Segler was asked what agency or individual had the greatest impact on the agreement. His response was: “The greatest political impact on the original CRBWA was California. California was apportioned 4.4 MAF, greater than any state along the Colorado. However, California’s drainage to the California was/is among the smallest.”
When asked if he felt the agreement had achieved its goals, Mr. Segler responded: “The original agreement did not entirely meet its goals and mission. It did not result in equitable division and apportionment of the use of waters, because Nevada is light. The agreement did not establish the relative importance of the different beneficial uses of water: California’s agriculture has the highest priority on the river. Interstate comity was not promoted, and the causes of present and future controversies were not removed. The one goal of the agreement that was met was the security of expeditious agricultural and industrial development of the Colorado River Basin. Some good work was done very quickly.”
Mr. Segler felt that in order to improve the agreement and lessen political impacts, “there should have been more federal involvement to mediate the agreement in order to improve the original agreement and help it achieve its mission and goals more effectively.”
Mr. Robert Walsh with the United States Bureau of Reclamation was also interviewed. As stated earlier, this organization’s mission was to “manage, develop, and protect water and related resources in an environmentally and economically sound manner in the interest of the American public.” This agency provided water flow and current and future agricultural estimates of the participating states for use in the CRBWA. Due to this type of involvement in the original agreement, it can be expected that the agency would not be likely to admit that its estimates were incorrect, or that the agreement was not or is not working.
When asked what he felt the greatest political impacts to the agreement were, Mr. Walsh stated: “The greatest political impacts to the original CRBWA were Herbert Hoover and Mr. Delph Carpenter. Both men played prominent roles in developing the form and substance of the plan and agreements that led to the development of the compact.”
When Mr. Walsh was asked if the agreement has achieved its original goals and mission, his answer was interesting. “As far as the primary mission and goals of the compact, for that time and most of the twentieth century the apportionments were equitable. It could be, and frequently is, argued today that the division of water was not fair and equitable. No document or compact can correctly predict what will happen one hundred years in the future, but the compact does provide the opportunity for water managers to address today’s water needs and issues.
The relative importance of the different beneficial uses of water were established to some extent, and additional clarification and direction was provided by the Supreme Court in its Arizona v. California decision.
Generally, interstate comity was promoted. The Basin States work together for the most part, although the relationships aren’t perfect. The cause of present and future controversies have not been removed for all time. I doubt that any single document/agreement/compact could accomplish that.
Finally, the expeditious agricultural and industrial development of the Colorado River Basin was secured through the construction of Hoover Dam and the water development projects that subsequently followed.”
Finally, Mr. Walsh doesn’t believe that there was anything that could have been done to lessen political impacts on the original agreement: “I’m not sure there are any changes that could be made to improve the original agreement and/or help it achieve its mission and goals more effectively. The compact served its purposes very well for more than seventy years, and it is still serving the purposes today for which it was created.”
The following section summarizes Mr. David Merritt’s (Colorado River Water Conservation District) interview responses. The Colorado River Water Conservation District administers water distribution within that state, and also represents state interests on interstate water agencies.
When asked what he felt that greatest political impact on the agreement was, Mr. Merritt replied: “California’s desire for certainty in its water future had the biggest impact on the Colorado River Basin Water Agreement. I believe that the original agreement succeeded in providing for the equitable division and apportionment in the use of waters. While it may not be ‘equal division,’ I believe that the test of time will show that it is equitable.”
Mr. Merritt was asked whether he felt the agreement meets its original goals and mission. He responded: “The agreement promoted interstate comity because it provided a mechanism to debate future demands; however, the agreement did not remove causes of present and future controversies. There were many issues that were unclear, and thus the cause of now-present controversies. The expeditious agricultural and industrial development of the Colorado River Basin was secured because it allowed the Boulder Canyon Project Act to go forward, and served to identify the water supply for the Colorado Basin Project Act and the Colorado River Storage Project Act.”
How did Mr. Merritt feel that political impacts could have been lessened? “A better knowledge of the hydrology of the basin could have lessened political impacts on the original agreement, as well as a mechanism for periodic review. Apportioning in ‘perpetuity’ is a long time.”
The next interview summary represents Ms. Pat Mulroy’ responses. She is the general manager of the Southern Nevada Water Authority, an agency that administers water distribution and use in the Las Vegas Valley.
Ms. Mulroy was asked what she felt the biggest political impact on the agreement was: “California was the principal concern that drove the other Basin States to push for a compact. So in terms of the overall dynamics behind the compact, California had tremendous impact then, as it does today.”
Did Ms. Mulroy feel that the agreement achieved its missions and goals? “Regarding whether or not the original agreement achieved its mission and goals, in many respects the compact achieved what its authors intended, given the general conditions at the time and each state’s concern over future access to Colorado River water. In other respects, it did not. For example, although the compact allocated specific amounts of water, it would take many years, additional agreements, and contentious court cases for the full details of these allocations and issues to be resolved (resulting in what is known as the ‘Law of the River’). Also, whereas conditions in the western United States have changed dramatically over the last seventy-five to eighty years, the Law of the River has been much slower to react and adapt to those changes.”
Ms. Mulroy went on to state: “As the West continues to urbanize, an ability to flex and respond to changing resource conditions is increasingly important; however, this kind of flexibility was not a goal of the original compact, nor was it a goal for many of the subsequent court decisions, agreements, or regulations that followed. It has taken the effort of all the Basin States, working together over the past ten to fifteen years, to realize concepts that have added greater flexibility to the Law of the River (for example, off-stream storage and interim surplus). Whereas the collective effort of the States speaks to the community envisioned by the compact’s authors, some of the impenetrable barriers imbedded in the agreement limit some of the options.”
What changes could have been made to improve the original agreement and/or help it achieve its mission and goals more effectively? “We would probably most obviously feel that the State of Nevada could have been given more water! Beyond that, the agreement could have been improved by extending active participation to Native American Tribes and Mexico, having access to more accurate data on historical basin flows, and giving consideration to environmental issues (which were clearly not a concern at the time).”
Was there anything that could have been done to lessen the political impacts on the original agreement? “At the time of the original agreement, the Colorado River represented one of the richest sources of readily available water in the desert southwest, and from a practical perspective, there is nothing more political than water in a desert. Consequently, political impacts of one type or another were to be expected in the river’s allocation. Based on my own experience with deliberative processes, it is fair to say that the number of stakeholders involved in the negotiations probably helped to reduce the nature of any political impacts that occurred. The more people there are at the table, the more difficult it is to wield one’s influence unilaterally.” This was a very different perspective than was voiced by any of the other interviewees, and one that is very interesting to consider.
According to the politics-administration dichotomy, politics should be kept completely separate from administration to avoid negative impacts, but as Ms. Mulroy observed, in some cases active participation in the political process can have a positive impact. When knowledgeable, fair politicians are involved in the process and are willing to reach consensus this can be a very positive process and the impacts can beneficial to all involved.
All the negative media hype could lead one to believe that all politicians are “crooks.” Are there good politicians? Amanda Cyphers, councilwoman with the City of Henderson and Chairman of the Southern Nevada Water Authority Board, proves that this phenomenon does exist. What came out of Councilwoman Cyphers’s interview serves as an example of how politicians/politics can have a positive impact.
“Many may view the current drought situation as ‘doom and gloom.’ Personally, I am excited about the drought because in the long run, we will have learned to better utilize this resource that we have all taken for granted. History has shown that we cannot continue to take and waste without consequence. The current drought is teaching us to be more responsible which will make us successful when we are challenged by any real ‘doom and gloom’ and to that point of consequence.
I am excited to be an elected official at this time, during a time that others state that they would not want to be such at this point. It is during such times that our leaders show us their worthiness and vision. I am hoping to prove myself a worthy steward.
The current issues of intrastate and Colorado water allocations are textbook and predictable. The positioning and turf battles are and were very expected such that any individual taking a basic class in sociology would be able to predict the different levels of action/reaction. Although it is not so clear on the future path, due to the many variables, I do know and have faith that at the end of the day, we will all have come to a solution that will benefit: (1) our environment, (2) our families, and (3) our future. I believe is was Mark Twain that said, ‘Whiskey is for drinking and water is for fighting.’
I am unsure of the exact course of how drought/water issues will develop, but I am certain that they will be developed… [even] when all the politicians and spin-doctors believe they have left the bargaining table as a winner. After all the dust settles from the current and future turf-battles over water rights, we will realize that we were fighting over a precious gift for all to share.”
Conclusion
A commonality politicians, agencies, legislation, and groups identified in the “Political Impacts” section of this paper was California. It is also notable that pluralists believe that the best way to identify power holders is to examine a range of specific decisions, noting who won and who lost. By applying this definition of power and taking into account the interviews with experts, California was the major political power holder impacting the development of the CRBWA: this state received the largest allocation of resources and won several subsequent court decisions regarding the agreement. Coolidge’s hope for Pareto optimality through creation of the CRBWA was not achieved: at least one group was disadvantaged. Arizona received far less water allocation that it was entitled to and that may be attributable to California’s major political influence on the development of the agreement.
Another common thread in the interviews is that the interviewees did not believe that the agreement has achieved its goals and mission, with the majority believing that political factors were a primary cause of this.
In 1887, Woodrow Wilson wrote “The Study of Administration,” outlining his theories for the politics-administration dichotomy. As quoted from this article: “The broad plans of governmental action are not administrative; the detailed execution of such plans is administrative. Constitutions, therefore, properly concern themselves only with those instrumentalities of government which are to control general law.” Or, in other words, “Administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics.” Wilson also said “steady, practical statesmanship must come first, closet doctrine second” (Wilson 1887).
In applying the politics-administration dichotomy to the CRBWA, Wilson’s hope was not realized: politics did and does overlap into the administration of the agreement. But politics creeping into administration is not a unique phenomenon in water agreements, or in American government for that matter. Several interstate water compacts have experienced similar impacts to the CRBWA.
The Republican River Water Compact (Kansas-Colorado-Nebraska) and the Chattahoochee River Compact are two water agreements that have experienced similar phenomenon to the CRBWA: accusations of political influence and interstate squabbles and controversy over equitable water division.
The Republican River Compact was negotiated during the early 1940s to “provide for equitable division of such waters, remove all causes of controversy, promote interstate comity, promote joint action by the states and the United States in the efficient use of water and the control of destructive floods, and provide for the most efficient use of waters in the Republican River Basin.”
In May 1998, Kansas filed a motion stating that Nebraska had breached the terms of the Republican River Compact by allowing the proliferation and use of groundwater wells connected to the Republican River and by failing to protect the surface flows from unauthorized appropriations.
In October 2001, the states participating in the Republican River Compact reached a settlement to utilize a groundwater model to quantify consumptive use by each state as part of the compact’s accounting procedures.
The Chattahoochee River Compact is also currently being disputed. In 1989, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers entered into a contract with the state of Georgia that allowed for significant withdrawal from the Chattahoochee River for the City of Atlanta. When this contract was announced, the state of Alabama commenced a lawsuit in U.S. District Court, which the state of Florida later joined. There are three options to resolve this water dispute: equitable apportionment by the U.S. Supreme Court, development of an interstate compact like the one other states have signed, or congressional apportionment.
So what are the lessons to be learned from the CRBWA for public administration? Politics will always be present in government: there is no way to completely separate it from administration. But is there a way to minimize those impacts? By utilizing research, analysis, and interviews gathered, the following recommendations have been formulated to minimize the impact of politics on the agreement and assist in the attainment of the goals of the CRBWA (equitable water division and removal of interstate controversy).
Recommendation one: Allow for periodic review of the agreement, taking into account shifts in population and water usage. Recommendation two: Utilize historical, scientific water data and trends to take a more scientific approach to water allocation calculations. Recommendation three: Lessen the priority of agricultural industry and place the emphasis back on human population and water consumption needs. Recommendation four: Pay more consideration to environmental issues. Recommendation five: Address water allocation changes in times of drought and periods of shortage. Recommendation six: Utilize groundwater models (as in the Republican River Compact) in order to calculate and allocate water.
The results of research, interviews, and analysis have provided valuable lessons for the CRBWA and for public administration in general, with the goal being minimized political impacts and attainment of the goals of the agreement.
References
Erhardt, Carl., (1992). “The battle over ‘The Hooch:’ Federal-Interstate Water Compact and the resolution of rights in the Chattahoochee River.” Stanford Environmental Law Journal, 11, 200–228.
Ingram, H., Scaff, Lawrence, A., and Silko, Leslie, (1986), “Replacing confusion with equity: Alternatives for water policy in the Colorado River Basin.” New Courses for the Colorado River: Major Issues for the Next Century, G. D. Weatherfod and F. L. Brown, eds., University of New Mexico Press, Albuquerque, N.M.
NSLA Archives and Records. (2004). “Governor Emmet Boyle.” Online, ⟨http://dmla.clan.lib.nv.us/docs/nsla/⟩ [December 2005].
Quick MBA Strategic Management. (2004). “PEST Analysis.” Online, ⟨http://www.quickmba.com/strategy/pest.com⟩ [December 2005].
Reisner, Marc, (1986). Cadillac desert: The American west and its disappearing water, Penguin, New York.
Wilson, Woodrow, (1887). “The study of administration.” Political Science Quarterly 2 (June), 197–222.
Biographies
Polly Walker has over ten years’ experience working in the public sector, most recently at the City of Henderson Parks and Recreation Department, where she administers water-related grants and works to implement water efficiencies during drought. Polly has also worked for Clark County and holds a Master’s degree in public administration from the University of Oklahoma and a Master’s degree in business administration from the University of Phoenix. This article was excerpted from her Master’s prospectus paper from the University of Oklahoma.
Information & Authors
Information
Published In
Leadership and Management in Engineering
Volume 6 • Issue 2 • April 2006
Pages: 72 - 80
Copyright
© 2006 ASCE.
History
Received: Dec 5, 2005
Accepted: Dec 5, 2005
Published online: Apr 1, 2006
Published in print: Apr 2006
Authors
Metrics & Citations
Metrics
Citations
Download citation
If you have the appropriate software installed, you can download article citation data to the citation manager of your choice. Simply select your manager software from the list below and click Download.