Efficiency, Equity, and Drainage Design
Publication: Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering
Volume 109, Issue 2
Abstract
Of the various philosophical concepts considered, those presumably acceptable to a democratic society are utilitarianism and several notions which emphasize equity. Social welfare functions, which map individual preference orderings into a social choice, are examined for certain cases where such functions can be written explicitly. Benefit/cost ratio is one form of utilitarian social welfare function. Consequences to lower owners of upstream drainage developments are investigated, using game‐theoretic techniques and a definition of social power due to Harsanyi. Mathematical analysis indicates that the return period of the design flood and a parameter dependent on land use are “policy variables” requiring determination by a political process if utilitarianism is the social policy. If majority vote is the mechanism of determining social choice, a project design would be based on median value of expected flood damage. Assessment of each acre a uniform amount seems to be justified by application of a theory of games of fair division, while an objective of “equal social power” results in a policy of storm water retention for zero increase in runoff.
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Information & Authors
Information
Published In
Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering
Volume 109 • Issue 2 • April 1983
Pages: 85 - 102
Copyright
Copyright © 1983 ASCE.
History
Published online: Apr 1, 1983
Published in print: Apr 1983
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