Effects of Tariff Design in Risk Management of Privately Financed Infrastructure Projects
Publication: Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Volume 129, Issue 6
Abstract
The design of tariff is a key issue in the development of privately financed infrastructure projects. It involves the determination of tariff magnitude, the choice of tariff structure, and the design of adjustment mechanisms. Tariff structures can be an all-in tariff or a compound tariff. Tariff adjustment mechanisms can be used to address different risk factors such as inflation, exchange rate, demand, and fuel prices. An appropriate combination of tariff structure and adjustment mechanism can be effective to manage key risks of privately financed infrastructure projects. Simulation results show that a well-designed tariff can create a “win-win” solution for both project promoter and the host government.
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Information & Authors
Information
Published In
Journal of Construction Engineering and Management
Volume 129 • Issue 6 • December 2003
Pages: 610 - 618
Copyright
Copyright © 2003 American Society of Civil Engineers.
History
Received: Jan 15, 2002
Accepted: Aug 23, 2002
Published online: Nov 14, 2003
Published in print: Dec 2003
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